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As the administration of President Juan Manuel Santos sits across the negotiating table from the 
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), justice as a conduit for peace has 
dominated discourse on remediating the legacy of more than 50 years of internal conflict. Justice, 
however, like the conflict itself, is contested in both meaning and substance. This thesis will 
approach the topic of justice from both a human rights and transitional justice perspective, 
arguing the need for systematically disentangling the concept in its international, domestic, and 
grassroots iterations. It will contend that transitional justice policy will more effectively be 
designed if its claims of causality are subject to continued and rigorous empirical testing. 
Approaching the development of transitional justice in Colombia from an historical perspective, 
this thesis will focus on three cycles of government intervention to end the conflict. This will 
highlight the limits of related policy to date and suggest its re-orienting towards local realities, 
both experiential and structural, as a promising and necessary move to achieving peace in the 
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In the mid-1990s, the administration of Antanas Mockus, mayor of Bogota at the time, 
offered primarily symbolic and ritualistic “vaccines against violence” to a population suffering 
surges in instability from the myriad ways in which this “disease” was attacking the corpus of 
Colombian society. Two decades later, the country is still searching for its cure. As the 
administration of President Juan Manuel Santos sits across the negotiating table from the Fuerzas 
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), justice as a conduit for peace has dominated 
discourse on remediating the legacy of more than 50 years of internal conflict. Justice, however, 
like the conflict itself, is contested in both meaning and substance. In order to comprehend 
justice as a possible prescription for peace, it must be unpacked, disaggregated into its 
constituent parts, revealing its dictates, its inconsistencies, and its value. Doing so requires 
embedding the Colombian conflict in an international environment of human rights and 
transitional justice norms, in a periodization of national domestic policies related to it, and in the 
grassroots reactions to life in the crosshairs of violence. This variegated approach attempts to 
systematically understand the contours of the concept in order to address the question harrowing 
current prospects for peace, what is justice in Colombia?  
Approximating an answer requires an approach steeped in historical and current 
understandings and actualizations of the concept internationally, nationally, and at the grassroots. 
Doing so will challenge fundamental elements of justice: who it is meant to serve and who gets 
to decide. Internationally, ideals of justice have varied over time, in stride with the development 
of the international human rights movement since the end of World War II and the universality 
of norms, such as retributive justice, that it promotes. The criminal prosecution of human rights 




includes such mechanisms as truth and reconciliation commissions, lustration, and reparations 
policies), a field that evolved as a consequence of, and alongside, the human rights movement. 
What burgeoning human rights and transitional justice advocacy imparted to the international 
community was the assertion that impunity for grave violations of human rights cannot stand, 
both morally and in practice, if the resolution of conflict, understood equally as the end of 
violence and the reconciling of society, is to be achieved.  
Fixed within this dynamic environment of evolving international norms, Colombian 
policy related to peace and justice has varied over time, in ways that have both clashed with and 
sought to incorporate changing international standards and practices. The favored policies of 
amnesty and political inclusion in exchange for the laying down of arms that characterized the 
earlier demobilization of guerrilla groups in the 1990s gave way to the demobilization of 
paramilitary forces in the first decade of the 2000s through a process that sought to balance 
victims rights to truth, justice, and reparations with the concession of benefits and reduced or 
alternative sentences for former combatants. Efforts in this direction aimed to secure both the 
peace and reconciliation promised by the enactment of transitional justice mechanisms in a 
country reckoning with the legacy of a decades long conflict, along with the reality of continuing 
violence.  
In this atmosphere, the underwhelming success of the demobilization of paramilitary 
forces to achieve either end, along with the intense criticisms of current peace negotiations lead 
to critical questions concerning not only what justice is tasked with achieving, but also how 
justice may be more adequately imagined through its contextualization within the conflict it aims 
to ameliorate.  Such questions problematize justice as a concept overburdened by its malleability, 




in achieving defined aims. Assessing the relationship between justice and peace, along with other 
abstracts or proxies, including reconciliation, truth, and non-repetition, requires fundamentally 
challenging the traditional claims of transitional justice and proffering the difficult contention 
that while human rights may be accepted as universal as a first step, the ways in which they are 
protected or their violation punished, may not be equally so.  
Research evaluating the empirical effects of transitional justice mechanisms in varied 
conflict and post-conflict settings provide tempering evidence to the optimism and enthusiasm 
for their broad diffusion; nevertheless, through advancing an agenda that recognizes the 
community as a critical level of analysis, such research may offer the most fruitful opportunity to 
attune policies to the needs and desires of those that justice is meant to serve and where peace 
and reconciliation are meant to take root.1 A principal goal of this paper is to further contribute to 
this strain of research as it engages with the community level and the richness of data available 
in studies of the micro-dynamics of conflict. To this end, this paper will assess Colombia’s 
experience with initiatives intended to effect justice within a constellation of international norms 
and obligations, existent research as to the empirical outcomes of transitional justice 
mechanisms’ use, and the varied realities of a complex and ongoing conflict. It will contend that 
both peace and justice are chimeric aims if policies are unresponsive to needs and desires at the 
grassroots.  
The first section will provide an introduction to the conflict in Colombia, characterized 
by a multiplicity of armed actors, including various guerrilla groups, paramilitary forces, and 
state agents, and its confluence with other forms of violence and illegal activity, including drug-
																																																								
1 See, Anna Macdonald, ‘From the Ground Up: What Does the Evidence Tell Us about Local Experiences of 
Transitional Justice?,’ Transitional Justice Review, 1 No 3 (January 2015): 72—121; Rosalind Shaw and Lars 
Waldorf, and Pierre Hazan, editors, Localizing Transitional Justice: Interventions and Priorities After Mass 




trafficking, common crime, and the rise of the new paramilitary. Wavering both geographically 
and temporally in intensity, the conflict has entrenched the different communities of the vast 
country unevenly across space and time. An historic overview of these complexities will 
distinguish five cycles of government initiatives aimed at ending the conflict. The first cycle 
corresponds to failed negotiations with the government and guerrilla groups in the mid-1980s. 
The second cycle encompasses the partially successful peace agreements and demobilization of 
smaller guerrilla groups in the early 1990s. The third cycle includes the failed negotiations with 
the FARC at the end of the 20th century. The fourth cycle commences soon thereafter with the 
partially successful demobilization of the paramilitaries. Discussion of these past cycles will 
serve to situate the fifth and current cycle of ongoing negotiations between the FARC and the 
government within a broader frame of factors and conditions that allow for perhaps only a more 
qualified attainment of justice and peace. 
The second section will trace the development of international human rights’ norms and 
discourse and the transitional justice field in order to understand the obligations and 
opportunities for justice contemplated by both. It will place significant emphasis on the 
developing research agenda that seeks to empirically test the claims of transitional justice 
advocates in order to assess their efficacy and strengthen understandings of peace and justice 
outcomes.2 In a discussion of the development of transitional justice mechanisms from their 
implementation originally destined for post-authoritarian countries to their application in diverse 
																																																								
2 See, Michael Ben-Josef Hirsch, Megan MacKenzie, and Mohamed Sesay, ‘Measuring the Impacts of Truth and 
Reconciliation Commissions: Placing the Global ‘Success’ of TRCs in Local Perspective,’ Cooperation and 
Conflict, 43 No 3 (2012): 386—403; RS Ratner, Andrew Woolford, and Andrew C. Patterson, ‘Obstacles and 
Momentum on the Path to Post-Genocide and Mass Atrocity Reparations: A Comparative Analysis, 1945-2010,’ 
International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 55 No 3 (June 2014): 229—259; Elin Skaar, ‘Reconciliation in a 




conflict and post-conflict settings, it is necessary to consider if and when these mechanisms may 
be effective across distinct experiences of violence and the structural factors that engender it. 
Against this backdrop, the third section will discuss the design and implementation of 
national initiatives aimed at achieving peace and justice, focusing on the achievements and 
shortcomings of processes in Cycles 2 and 4. Detailing the agreements and institutions that 
governed the peace processes with smaller guerrilla groups in the 1990s and paramilitary forces 
in the early 2000s, this section will highlight the progressive incorporation of transitional justice 
mechanisms into Colombian policy and assess their contested compliance with international 
standards. Specific attention will be paid to the increasing role of victims rights, emphasis on 
truth-telling, and the linking of transitional justice mechanisms with official Disarmament, 
Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) programs, once solely imagined within the realm of 
security studies. Discussion of past initiatives will serve to contextualize the current negotiations, 
Cycle 5, and the agreements that have been reached thus far. Special emphasis will be given to 
analyzing the design and impact of the framework for the Comprehensive System of Truth, 
Justice, Reparation and Non-Repetition as outlined in the Agreement on Victims of the Conflict 
on both the understanding and practice of justice at the national level.  
Conscious of international norms and national policies, the fourth section will evaluate 
the shortcomings of prior peace processes through a re-focusing of analysis on the community 
level. By turning to available research on the micro-dynamic of the conflict it is both possible 
and necessary to re-tailor policies related to peace and justice to the specific experiences of war 




nationally by placing actors and actions against the backdrop of wartime institutions and the 
prospects of reconciling communities in territories long neglected by the state.3  
The fifth section will conclude with a summation of possible lessons to be learned from 
the Colombian experience with the implementation of justice policies for human rights and 
transitional justice practitioners, as well for the current and future design of domestic policy 
aimed at ending violence within the country. Formulaic attempts to resolve conflict through an 
equation of truth plus justice equals peace do not account for the complex environments in which 
these concepts must be operationalized. Advancing a research agenda focused on micro-
dynamics and the empirics of transitional justice outcomes will fruitfully challenge the coherence 
of justice as a singular concept in a particular context and suggest locally rooted understandings 
as key to attaining a viable peace. 
 
The Longest Insurgency and Other Violences 
To speak of the current conflict in Colombia is to recognize that after five decades of 
violence, conflict dynamics have re-shaped the phenomenon itself. Violence has unfolded amidst 
processes of state decentralization and the strengthening of the drug trade. Its narrative has 
ranged from ideological insurgency to drug war to fight against terrorism. It has permeated 
borders, the countryside, cities, and national and local institutions. Its impact has been so 
penetrating that questions have arisen as to whether Colombia itself suffers from a culture of 
violence.4 While consensus does not exist as to the precise origins of the conflict,5 an historical 
																																																								
3 See, Ana Arjona, ‘Wartime Institutions: A Research Agenda,’ Journal of Conflict Resolution, 58, No 8 (2014): 
1360—1389.  
4Peter Waldmann, ‘Is There a Culture of Violence in Colombia?,’ International Journal of Conflict and Violence, 1 
No 1 (2007): 61—75. 
5 There is a broad debate on just how far back in Colombian history it is necessary to go in order to understand the 
conflict as it has developed since the 1950s, as well as on the socio-economic, political, and opportunity structures 




approach is necessary to encompass the range of actors, acts, and structural factors that have 
contributed to the longest insurgency in Latin American history and the multiple forms of 
violence that have unfurled alongside and in confrontation with it.  
Likewise, this historical approach will trace the government’s reaction to such violence 
and the means with which they have sought to halt its continuance. Doing so produces a 
framework that distinguishes five cycles of government action to end the conflict. The fifth and 
current cycle represents a culmination of lessons learned, with an agenda that is explicit in its 
recognition that the end of conflict is not solely the laying down of arms. Peace, instead, must be 
based on the restoration of rights and justice in balance with the restrictions determined by a 
complex reality of ending violence in the midst of ongoing conflict.  
Though the FARC was founded in 1964, the seeds of guerilla organizing had been 
planted in the preceding decades. Political exclusion, expressed both geographically through the 
marginalization of citizens outside of Bogota’s dominating political force and theoretically 
through the suppression of leftist thought, had been the hallmark of Colombian politics since the 
Liberal and Conservative Parties established their dominance at independence in 1810.  The 10-
year period of political violence known as La Violencia (1948-1958) further entrenched this 
reductive political space through the formalization of the power-sharing pact, the National 
Front.6 Finding no room within the political establishment for progressive policies related to land 
reform and social justice, members of peasant militias that had fought under the banner of the 
Liberals soon after regrouped in alliance with the Communist Party (CP) to form what would 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
Conflict and its Victims,” an over 800-page tome that developed from an agreement between the FARC and the 
government as a start to the building of an historical record of the conflict. Access to the document can be found at 
https://www.mesadeconversaciones.com.co/comunicados/informe-comisio%CC%81n-histo%CC%81rica-
del-conflicto-y-sus-vi%CC%81ctimas-la-habana-febrero-de-2015. Accessed May 22, 2016. 
6 Under this arrangement, the Conservative and Liberal Parties would alternate power every four years; the 




become the largest guerrilla insurgency in the country, the FARC. The violent state repression of 
Leftists, peasants, and peasant self-defense forces that followed its founding solidified future 
strongholds of FARC control. With assistance from the CP, displaced populations were relocated 
to the isolated areas of the Amazonian foothills and the less productive lands in the plains 
region.7 Absent an official path for political opposition, armed struggle became the means to 
challenge the state. In this context and in the decades that followed, numerous other insurgent 
groups taking up the banners of socialism and social justice were founded, including the National 
Liberation Army (ELN) in 1964, the People’s Liberation Army (EPL) in 1967, the April 19th 
Movement (M-19) and the Autodefensa Obrera (ADO) in 1974, the Workers Revolutionary 
Party (PRT) in 1982, the Quintín Lame Armed Movement (Quintín Lame) in 1984, and the 
People’s Revolutionary Army (ERP) in 1985.  
The proliferation of armed insurgents in the early years of the conflict must be 
contextualized within both the domestic and international environments that, respectively, fueled 
and attempted to stem their growth. Following the success of the Cuban Revolution, United 
States policy in the Latin American region aimed at curbing the communist threat. To this end, 
the Kennedy Administration in 1961 initiated the Alliance for Progress (AFP), a 10-year, 20-
million dollar social and economic development strategy meant to serve as a bulwark against the 
spread of communist insurgency through the elimination of the sources of economic 
disadvantage. Designed to address issues of joblessness, illiteracy, access to education, deficient 
infrastructure, and the unequal distribution of wealth, the AFP has been criticized for failing to 
achieve long-term success due to the short sightedness of its goals as distorted by Cold War 
politics and maneuvering. In this context, authoritarianism was confirmed as preferable to leftist 
																																																								





revolution, leading the U.S. to support the politically exclusive National Front in Colombia, 
along with right-wing regimes, such as the dictatorships in Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and 
Uruguay, well versed in the repressive practices that constituted the region’s multiple dirty wars.  
In his study of the role of humanitarian and development assistances’ effects on citizen 
security, Samir Elhawary argues that the AFP in Colombia resulted in the prioritization of state 
security over that of its civilian population.8 While promoting such goals as agrarian reform in 
order to forestall communist sympathies amongst the economically marginalized, such efforts led 
to unintended results. Bolstered by economic aid, Colombia established Law 135 of 1961 to 
create the Colombian Institute of Agrarian Reform (INCORA), tasked with improving land 
titling, modernizing the agrarian economy, and supporting the peasantry and landless through 
greater land access. Such reform, however, was made difficult by the National Front coalition, 
which stymied any hopes of building the broad base of political support needed to undertake 
such projects. As a consequence, regional elites further strengthened their grip on power while 
efforts to expropriate land for more productive use were limited by the favorable terms conceded 
to large landholders. Despite the 350 million dollars allocated to Colombia between 1963 and 
1969, development aid as a counter-insurgency strategy had failed. The inability of the AFP to 
fracture the structural grievances of the conflict had the consequence of pushing peasant 
migration towards the stateless peripheries of the agricultural frontier, setting the stage for 
guerrilla activity to flourish.  
Though the conflict remained relatively low in intensity in the 1970s and into the early 
1980s, in terms of both the geographical expansion of the various groups and the armed actions 
that they undertook, the growing number of insurgents steered the government towards 
																																																								
8 Samir Elhawary, ‘Security for whom? Stabilisation and Civilian Protection in Colombia,’ Disasters, 34 No S3 




increasingly oppressive policies to regain lost footing. The enactment of the controversial 
Security Statute of 1978 exemplified what has been referred to as the “difficult polarization of 
fear” that characterized this period in the country: 
…on the one hand, there was the fear of the guerrilla’s actions, 
which gained greater military and territorial control in its armed 
struggle, and on the other hand, the fear of state repression, as the 
cases of arbitrary detentions, forced disappearances, and torture at 
the hands of state forces increased, with such actions being 
justified as the defense of internal security, there was a politic of 
enemies.9 
 
In this environment of increasing insecurity, the administration of Belisario Betancur, 
elected in 1982, initiated what can be distinguished as a first cycle in the government’s approach 
to securing peace. In this cycle, the government suspended the Security Statute and conferred 
unconditional amnesty to political prisoners as a precursor to the state’s attempt at a negotiated 
settlement with the insurgent groups. In 1984, the government signed several ceasefire 
agreements with the FARC, M-19, EPL, and ADO.  With these agreements in place, there was a 
moment in which the political door to the opposition was seemingly opened. The newly formed 
Patriotic Union (UP), a broad coalition of Leftist movements founded by the FARC and the CP, 
gained momentum; in the 1986 elections, 14 of its members were elected to the House and 
Senate, 18 were elected as representatives in departmental level assemblies, and 355 were 
elected as local councilman.10  
Despite UP’s electoral successes, the peace process with the various guerrilla groups was 
plagued by multiple issues from the start, including the violation of ceasefire arrangements by 
both state forces and insurgent groups, the resignation of members of the Peace Commission in 
																																																								
9 Jenner Alonso Tobar Torres, ‘Violencia política y guerra sucia en Colombia. Memoria de una víctima del conflicto 
colombiano a propósito de las negociaciones de la Habana,’ Revistas, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana, 19, No. 38 
(2015): 11. All translations by the author. 




response to the fledgling process, and the notable growth of paramilitary forces. In one of the 
most haunting instance of armed hostilities during this period, members of M-19 took control of 
the Palace of Justice in Bogotá in 1985, resulting in the death of at least 96 individuals, including 
nearly half of the Supreme Court, and the disappearance of 11 in the guerrilla takeover and 
military recovery of the site. At the same time, paramilitary forces, with origins in local self-
defense groups fighting against the actions of guerrilla combatants, began to expand and 
intensify their actions, often overlapping and working in conjunction with state security forces. 
The combination of continued fighting and its hampering effect on the peace process, along with 
the growing threat to the guerrillas mounted by the paramilitaries were ultimately lethal to the 
process. By 1987, it had officially failed amidst an upsurge in violence that included the 
assassinations of roughly 3,000-4,000 members and supporters of the UP, carried out primarily 
by paramilitary forces, with the perceived collusion of the state.11 
In their study of the dynamics of the conflict between 1988-1990, Jorge Restrepo, 
Michael Spagat, and Juan Vargas identify 5 factors that account for the increase in violence 
during this period: 1) a rise in narcotrafficking and its accompanying criminality; 2) the failed 
peace process between the Belisario Betancurt administration and the guerillas; 3) the systematic 
extermination of members of the FARC’s political wing, the Patriotic Union; 4) the 
strengthening of paramilitary groups; and 5) a reduction in Soviet support as the Cold War came 
to a close, leading to increases in guerrilla kidnappings and extortion.12 Likewise, Fabio Sánchez 
and María del Mar Palau identify the process of political, administrative, and fiscal 
																																																								
11 Jim Rochlin, ‘Plan Colombia and the Revolution in Military Affairs: the Demise of the FARC,’ Review of 
International Studies, 37 (2011): 721. 
12 Jorge Restrepo, Michael Spagat, and Juan Vargas, ‘The Dynamics of the Colombian Civil Conflict: A New Data 




decentralization taking place in Colombia at the time as the perfect storm for the growing 
presence of competing armed groups: 
…on the one hand, local governments have less repressive capacity 
than the central government so local leaders are more susceptible 
to intimidation, and on the other, as more resources are transferred 
to local governments, the ‘pot’ available for plundering increases. 
Decentralization has been, therefore, an opportunity for the illegal 
groups to widen their political influences and enhance their sources 
of financing.13 
 
The rise in drug-trafficking and related criminality in this period added another layer of 
complexity to the conflict. By 1987, it is estimated that Colombian drug cartels, principally the 
Medellín and Cali cartels, were selling more than $20 billion of cocaine to North American and 
European market.14 Their by-any-means-necessary approach to growing what they viewed as a 
lucrative business, led to profound social and political impacts. These cartels were ruthless in 
silencing their critics, especially those who sought their extradition, and had a severe chilling 
effect on the media. Cartel violence was often aimed at high-level political figures, but likewise 
targeted laborers, peasants, guerrillas, social and political activists, state defense forces, and the 
military. In his study of the effects of the drug trade on democracy in the 1980s, Jonathan 
Hartlyn notes the especially traumatic effect it has on the judiciary, silencing attempts to combat 
impunity for related crimes through bribes, threats, and assassinations.15 Likewise, Hartlyn notes 
the profound linkages between drug-traffickers and other illegal armed groups, such as the 
FARC, finding a common enemy in the state as it seeks to destroy coca production. Important to 
note, however, is the competition that equally exists between the groups, as the FARC similarly 
																																																								
13 Fabio Sanchez and Maria del Mar Palau, ‘Conflict, Decentralisation and Local Governance in Colombia, 1974-
2004,’ Documento Cede 2006-20 (May 2006): 14.  
14 Robert Filippone, ‘The Medellín Cartel: Why We Can’t Win the Drug War,’ Studied in Conflict and Terrorirsm, 
17 (1994): 323—344.  
15 Jonathan Hartlyn, ‘Drug Trafficking and Democracy in Colombia in the 1980s,’ Working Paper No. 70, 




aims to to secure an independent position in the drug market. Drug-related violence in this period 
is thus a consequence of not only cartels seeking to maintain their drug empires, but likewise a 
result of their both collusive and competitive relationship with other illegal armed groups. 
Hartlyn emphasizes the de-stabilizing effects of drug-trade violence on state institutions and faith 
in the state itself. Colombia at the end of the 1980s was in crisis. 
 Beyond the impulse provided by the escalation in violence, peace negotiations were re-
initiated at the end of the 1980s, ushering in the second cycle of government initiatives to secure 
peace. The talks were facilitated in part by the Virgilio Barco administration’s proposed reform 
of the 1886 Constitution with the intent of opening up the political system to the opposition.16 
Though not adopted, the proposed reform led the M-19 to organize as a political party in 
November 1989.17 Negotiations with the M-19 culminated in a peace agreement between the 
armed group and, signed on March 9, 1990. The successful negotiations with the M-19 spurred 
continued talks between the César Gaviria government and the PRT, EPL, Quintín Lame, 
Commando Ernesto Rojas (CER), Current Socialist Renewal (CRS), Popular Militias of 
Medellín (MPM), the Francisco Garnica Front (FFG), and the Armed Movement of Independent 
Commandos (MIR-COAR).18 By 1994, the government had signed agreements with each of the 
aforementioned groups, granting them legal political status, guaranteeing their political 
participation through the appointment of representatives to Congress, and offering them the 
benefit of participating in the National Constituent Assembly that would reform the Constitution 
in 1991, had they been in advanced stages of talks at the time. 
																																																								
16 Sergio Jaramillo, Yaneth Giha, and Paula Torres, ‘Transitional Justice and DDR: The Case of Colombia,’ 
International Center for Transitional Justice (June 2009): 1—57. 
17 Joakim Kreutz, ‘Colombia, 1978-Present,’ in Karl R. DeRouen and Uk Heo, eds., Civil Wars of the World: Major 
Conflicts since World War II, Volume 1 (ABC-CLIO, 2007): 286.  




 Despite the exit of these numerous guerrilla groups from the armed conflict and the 
accompanying dip in violence that immediately followed, the later years of the 1990s again saw 
an increase in intensity. Noted as the “upsurge period,” Restrepo, Spagat, and Vargas detail an 
increase in guerrilla, paramilitary, government, and civilian casualties after 1996.19 This period is 
characterized by what they view as the paramilitarization of the conflict. They find, “paramilitary 
attacks increase when there is a combination of infrequent government clashes and frequent 
guerrilla attacks. In other words, paramilitary activity substitutes for government activity.”20 In 
1997, the multiple paramilitary groups operating throughout the country were united under the 
umbrella organization, the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), notably the most 
indiscriminate actors in the murder of civilians and increasingly incorporated within the 
networks of drug-trafficking and associated with conflict atrocities. By 2002, they were 
operating in 28 of Colombia’s 32 departments.21 Similarly, by the late 1990s, some form of 
guerilla presence was estimated in approximately three-fourths of all Colombian 
municipalities.22  
This peaking of violence in the late 1990s led into the third cycle of government 
negotiations. In his discussion of the Andrés Pastrana administration’s decision to resume efforts 
at a negotiated peace with the FARC in 1998, Juan Gabriel Tokatlian presents some sobering 
statistics of the conflict in this period: 10 deaths per day were attributed to political violence, 
approximately 10% of municipalities were wholly or partially destroyed by the guerrillas, 194 
massacres were carried out in 1998 alone (perpetrated primarily by paramilitaries), 
approximately 9,407 individuals were kidnapped between 1996-1999 (including those carried 
																																																								
19 Supra n 12. 
20	Jorge A. Restrepo and Michael Spagat, ‘Colombia’s Tipping Point?,’ Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 47, 
No 2 (June 2005): 148.	
21 Supra n 13 at 12. 




out by common criminals), and by the second half of the decade, roughly 300,000 Colombians 
left the country in addition to the more than 1 million that were internally displaced.23 In this 
context, the government initiated talks after taking the extraordinary measure of ceding an area 
roughly the size of Switzerland in southern Colombia to the FARC. While meant to serve as a 
ceasefire zone, Caguán became the site from which the guerrillas were able to re-fortify 
themselves without state intervention at the same time as negotiations were failing bring any 
fruitful results.24  
While the negotiations failed to produce a political solution to the conflict, the Pastrana 
administration did succeed in securing the roughly $1.3 billion U.S. aid package, known as Plan 
Colombia. Originally designed as a counter-narcotics effort, funding under the plan was directed 
primarily at counter-insurgency. Not officially launched until 2000, Plan Colombia led to the 
modernizing of the Colombian military and made possible a re-strategizing of the conflict. The 
experience in Caguán would catalyze support for the hardline policies of Àlvaro Uribe, elected 
President in 2002, and conflict re-militarization. Under the policy known as Democratic 
Security, the Uribe administration sought to expand military and police presence to all areas of 
the country, along with the building up of networks of citizen informants, with the aim of 
recovering territory lost to the illegal armed groups and establishing an often-absent state in the 
most remote reaches of Colombia. These counterinsurgency efforts were bolstered by U.S. aid 
under Plan Colombia, which had reached over 4 and a half billion dollars by 2006.25  U.S. 
support for anti-drug campaigns in a post 9/11 world helped shift the conflict towards rhetoric 
that envisaged the guerrillas as narco-terrorists, significantly altering the possibility of a 
																																																								
23 Juan Gabriel Tokatlian, ‘Una reflexión en torno a Colombia, 1999-2002 ¿negociación para la paz o proceso para 
la guerra?,’ Foro Internacional, 44, No. 4 (Oct-Dec, 2004): 636.  
24 Supra n 11.  




negotiated peace during Uribe’s tenure. The renewed vigor of official state forces in the conflict 
had significant effects on conflict dynamics. Restrepo and Spagat identify a drop in guerrilla 
attacks during this time, as well as a decrease in civilian deaths (though injuries reached record 
levels, as did combatant deaths), while noting that the clashes between the government and 
guerrillas reached their highest point.26 Likewise, a correlation between increased government 
intervention and fewer paramilitary attacks is noted during this period. Any gains in civilian 
security under Democratic Security, however, may be over-shadowed by the now notorious 
polemic of “false-positives” in which state forces are implicated in the murder of at least 3,000 
innocent civilians, dressing their victims in guerrilla uniforms in order to boost the number of 
enemy combatants killed.27 
While the Uribe administration focused militarily on defeating the guerrillas, it turned to 
a negotiated solution with the paramilitary forces to bring an end to their indiscriminate killing of 
civilians, increasing involvement in the drug trade, and pervasive corruption of state institutions. 
AUC leader Vicente Castaño famously bragged that 35% of Congress were friends of the 
paramilitary,28 helping to crystallize public opinion against the paramilitary forces that had once 
enjoyed both official and implicit support at various moments of the conflict. This fourth cycle, 
which led to the demobilization of more than 30,000 former paramilitaries beginning in 2003, 
was a significant factor in the decrease in civilian deaths during the Uribe administration. The 
peace process with the paramilitaries was the first in Colombia to require elements of truth-
telling and victims reparations along with the possibility of alternative sentencing and benefits 
for former combatants. The success of the demobilization program must nevertheless be 
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qualified by what has been observed as the re-constitution of former paramilitaries into the 
violent and pervasive criminal groups known as the BACRIM,29 along with the insufficiency of 
reparatory measures.  
Current conflict statistics estimate the total number of people killed at over 218,000, 80% 
of which are civilians, the number of people displaced at more than 5.7 million, and the number 
of people disappeared at a minimum of 25,000.30 It is in this atmosphere of multiple violences 
and perpetrators, that Colombia is tasked with the challenge of administering justice. The failures 
and limited successes of past cycles have proffered a number of lessons for guiding the current 
negotiations towards the achievement of peace. While Cycle 1 initiated a period of optimism and 
the opening of the political process, the growing threat of the paramilitary and drug-trafficking 
criminality ultimately doomed the success of a negotiated settlement. This period highlights the 
critical need to view the conflict within the broader environment of violence and insecurity. This 
point is reiterated again in Cycle 2. Although negotiated settlements were reached with various 
guerrillas groups, a tribute to the efficacy of political inclusivity, the failure to comprehensively 
approach the dismantling of the paramilitaries left the FARC resistant to participation in talks 
that were viewed as a threat to their safety. The devastating failure of negotiations with the 
FARC in Cycle 3 highlights the significant enmity and disillusionment that can follow such 
processes and the political tenability of negotiating with the insurgent group. Concessions in this 
cycle, along with their unsuccessful outcome, continue to haunt current processes that engage the 
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FARC as anything but enemies. Cycle 4, while boasting the demobilization of tens of thousands 
of former paramilitaries, must be scrutinized for its failure to address the systems of violence 
operating within the country that permit a re-constitution of conflict actors into newly 
threatening groups. Likewise, the limited success of restorative measures suggests a need for 
both increased reparations and the institutional capacity to carry them out.    
The Santos’ administration has approached the current negotiations with the FARC, 
Cycle 5, as the critical moment for securing peace in Colombia. In doing so, the concessions 
made have, on paper, been elaborated as a complex process of peace, justice, and social change. 
In August 2012, the government and the FARC entered into the “General Agreement for the End 
of Conflict and the Construction of a Stable and Lasting Peace”.31 The ongoing negotiations have 
revolved around the agreed upon 6-point agenda, encompassing: 1) agrarian reform; 2) political 
participation; 3) the end of the conflict; 4) the problem of illicit drugs; 5) victims; and 6) 
implementation, verification, and legalization. To date, draft agreements on a solution to illegal 
drugs, agrarian reform, political participation, and victims have been announced.32 The 
agreement on victims, made public on December 15, 2015, and the joint communiqué on 
transitional justice measures, announced on September 23, 2015, have been the greatest sources 
of contention, rhetorically dividing the country into two camps: friends and enemies of peace, 
with both proponents and opponents of the process claiming the banner of defending the elusive 
goal and hurling insult across the aisle.33   
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The provision of alternative sentences, along with judicial proceedings that require 
elements of truth telling are complemented by measures to address the drug trade and 
paramilitary violence. Do the terms so far agreed upon provide justice for Colombia and the 
millions of victims in its conflict? Can they provide the groundwork for a stable and lasting 
peace? The following section will consider these questions through the lens of the international 
norms related to human rights and transitional justice. Tracing the development of these 
international standards and new avenues of research related to the implementation of transitional 
justice mechanisms may be helpful as a first step in determining whose voice should echo 
loudest in calls for justice in Colombia. 
 
International Antidotes 
Colombian policy related to human rights and transitional justice has increasingly sought 
the inclusion of restorative measures while, likewise, seeking compliance with international 
norms that place obligations, at least discursively, to provide punishment adequate to the crimes 
committed. The difficulties of addressing human rights abuses is exacerbated in a long-running, 
multi-party conflict, such as Colombia’s, that puts to the test the adaptability of human rights and 
transitional justice mechanisms’ implementation in a context that seeks a balance of justice in the 
name of peace. Aware that the world is watching, the government’s chief negotiator, Humberto 
de la Calle, recently remarked on both the will and capacity of Colombia to undertake a genuine 
process of transitional justice.34 Whether this process is able to achieve the dual goals of justice 
and peace is inextricably linked to the international environment and its ability to legitimize state 
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interventions and perceptions to them. A principal contention is, thus, that scrutiny of 
Colombia’s transitional justice policy from the international community matters, by way of the 
hampering effects of negative discourse surrounding policies and the diversion of funding that 
may follow such recommendations.  
Spanning more than 50 years, the conflict in Colombia has long been enmeshed within 
the dynamic international system and the changing normative framework that has adjusted to the 
ascendency of the human rights movement.  To understand the legal and moral claims to which 
the Colombian state is subject, it is necessary to analyze the development of human rights norms 
and transitional justice mechanisms in order to assess what justice is demanded of Colombia in 
the way of international obligations. This section will argue that though there is a significant 
body of law surrounding human rights and the laws of war, whose violation by all parties to the 
conflict is without question, there exists ambiguity as to the legal imperative to provide recourse 
for such abuses by way of a specific mechanism. In this way, the dominant discourse of the 
international human rights movement that seeks to compel states to enact retributive measures 
based on international law is challenged as factually tenuous. As such, it will be contended that a 
more flexible approach to transitional justice should guide policy that seeks to engender 
sustainable peace, based on continued empirical research as to a given mechanism’s 
effectiveness in providing for the desired outcome.  
The modern international human rights movement, originating in a post-WWII world 
reeling from the devastating loss of human life and rights abuses, grew up around the signing of 
the UN Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 and subsequent core treaties. This encompasses the 
principal international human rights treaties, including the International Convention on the 




Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (1966), the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
(1979), the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (1984), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), and international 
humanitarian law as enshrined in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols. 
Likewise, the establishment of international instruments, such as the American Convention on 
Human Rights, overseen by the Organization of American States, and the Rome Statute, 
establishing the International Criminal Court, provide additional guidance as the to the rights of 
individuals under international law and states’ obligations to ensure they are satisfied.  
Despite its troubling human rights record, Colombia, a party to all aforementioned 
treaties and conventions, has made strides to incorporate the legal framework of international 
human rights law into its domestic structures. As dictated in the reformed Constitution of 1991, 
all such treaties maintain constitutional supremacy under domestic law. In fact, the Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights were 
critical influences in the re-drafting of the Constitution.35 Similarly, Christof Heyns and Frans 
Viljoen note the Colombian Constitution Court’s zealous referencing of international treaties 
treaties, with specific reference to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights made in 129 cases 
between 1992 and 1998.36 The development of these international human rights bodies and 
instruments, along with the movement that supported their growth and influence, have succeeded 
in altering human rights discourse from its focus on states rights and sovereignty to that of 
human-centric individual rights. Likewise, the elaboration of states’ obligations to provide truth, 
justice, reparations, and guarantees of non-repetition in international human rights law has 
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afforded much needed protections to victimized and marginalized populations. The question 
arises, however, as to the appropriate measure to provide recourse when international human 
rights are violated. In the case of Colombia contending with human rights abuses must be placed 
within the framework of transitional justice policy. As such, interpretations of justice are 
contextualized within the broader debate concerning the clash between the retributive discourse 
promoted by the international human rights movement and the exceptional circumstances of 
conflict and transitional settings that require greater flexibility.  
In his discussion of international law in the resolution of conflict in Colombia, Jose E. 
Arvelo identifies three positions that dominated discussion of transitional justice policy during 
Cycle 4 and that apply equally to the current polemic surrounding providing justice and 
accountability in Cycle 5.37 The first approach, classified as peace-forgiveness, stresses blanket 
amnesties as a precursor to ensuring peace, as opposed to the vengefulness illegal armed groups 
associated with retributive measures. The second approach, denoted as peace-justice balancing, 
endorses truth and reparations alongside alternative sentences for illegal armed actors in order to 
both provide for redress to victims and ensure perpetrators’ continued participation in the 
process. The third approach, termed strict justice, requires the centrality of victims and a rigid 
view of justice for human rights violations as retributive in nature. While international human 
rights law is clear in its provision of victims’ rights to truth, justice, reparations, guarantees of 
non-repetition, these varying approaches are representative of the interpretive conflicts that exist 
in the design of transitional justice policy. In Colombia, the debate concerning (non)compliance 
with international law has centered on issues of accountability and whether amnesties and 
alternative sentences satisfy these four international obligations.  
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In a further elaboration of these obligations, Arvelo finds international law does not 
specify the prioritization of specific mechanisms. While the blanket amnesties advocated for 
under a peace-forgiveness approach would violate such treaties as the American Convention on 
Human Rights as interpreted by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, a review of 
additional treaty law complicates calls for a strict justice approach. He specifies: 
In sum, international law does not command a particular punitive 
result in Colombia's efforts to achieve a peaceful resolution of its 
conflict with powerful armed non-state actors. This fact may 
explain UNHCHR (Colombia) Director Fruhling's qualified 
demands for Colombian compliance with purported international 
"principles and norms" as opposed to hard-and-fast international 
laws. (252) Thus, the force of the "strict justice" case for strict 
retribution derives mostly from the morality and legitimacy of 
proportionate accountability for international crimes, not from 
developed international law. While "strict justice" proponents may 
see this as a weakness of the legal order to be remedied, the result 
is nevertheless more attuned to international law's twin aims of 
peaceful resolution of disputes on the one hand and protection of 
innocent war victims on the other.38 
 
 Yet, the strict approach continues to dominate criticisms of Colombian transitional 
justice policy as it has favored a balance of peace and justice. International human rights NGOs, 
including Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, persist in their condemnation of past 
and current cycles of negotiations with illegal armed actors that allow for alternative sentencing 
and amnesties for political crimes alongside restorative measures. Thus, the absence of a legal 
imperative does not prohibit a discourse of international human rights that seeks to 
institutionalize criminal justice as the mechanism required to ensure states’ compliance with 
human rights obligations. The chasm between existent legal obligations and the discourse that 
reigns within the international human rights movement and influences its policy 
recommendations requires deeper discussion of the normative development of international 
																																																								




criminal accountability for human rights violations and its interaction with additional transitional 
justice mechanisms.  
Kathryn Sikkink’s well-documented study of the rise of the justice norm, one significant 
achievement of the mobilization for human rights, contends that  
…there has been a shift in the legitimacy of the norm of individual 
criminal accountability for human rights violations and an increase 
in criminal prosecutions on behalf of that norm. The term [the 
justice cascade] captures how the idea started as a small stream, 
but later caught on suddenly, sweeping along many actors in its 
wake.39  
 
The momentum of this specific norm is emblematic of the dynamism of the human rights 
movement. For decades, she argues, impunity and state accountability models succeeded ahead 
of calls for individual criminal accountability, yet, in line with the human rights movement, 
justice is defined by this very legal accountability for crimes.40 Indeed, establishing an 
international legal framework around human rights has been identified as the ‘central collective 
project’ of the movement for more than a half-century.41 
The ‘cascade’ of the justice norm and specification of international laws related to human 
rights were hard fought victories of the movement. To understand such developments, Martha 
Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink propose a three-phase model of a norm ‘life cycle.’42 The first 
stage, norm emergence, requires the work of norm entrepreneurs in getting the ball rolling, while 
the second, norm cascade, hinges on the socialization of states, norm entrepreneurs, and 
international organizations to affect the behavior of non-compliers until the moment of 
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internalization, the third stage, by which norm compliance becomes the dominant behavior. 
Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink further elaborate the interactive development of human 
rights through their conceptualization of the ‘boomerang effect’43, which they define as the 
strategy by which domestic groups bypass the state in order to form alliances with international 
allies that can then bring pressure back to bear on a norm violating government.  
The fluidity of progress implied by the terminology of cascading justice belies, however, 
the irregular development of transitional justice more broadly in fits and starts. In her 
genealogical approach, Ruti G. Teitel delineates three phases of transitional justice, which 
respond to the specific political limitations on the perceived possibilities for imagining justice in 
a particular context.44 The first phase occurred post-World War II with the Allied victors 
carrying out justice at the Nuremberg Trials. Teitel notes the post-WWI failure of German 
domestic trials and collective sanctions against the country to deter another war as key factors in 
the turn towards international law and its applicability to individuals as the appropriate response 
in extraordinary transitional circumstances.  
In Phase II, post-Cold War transitional justice, the political transitions occurring in South 
America’s Southern Cone, Eastern Europe, and Central America ushered in a return to domestic 
trials and the novel creation of hybrid courts as the appropriate venues to enact justice in an 
international environment accommodating itself to the end of bipolarity and a new wave of 
democratization. It is in this second phase that Teitel notes the emergence of multiple 
conceptions of justice. While international law serves as a complement to domestic law and the 
latter is further bolstered as legitimate through the conception that the norm of criminal justice 
may contribute to nation-building, the limiting political conditions of transitional moments 
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themselves open up the possibility of seeking amnesty to secure peace in precarious 
environments. She notes: 
Phase II moved beyond retributive justice as historically understood. The 
transitional dilemmas at stake in Phase II were framed in terms more 
comprehensive than simply confronting or holding accountable the 
predecessor regime, and included questions about how to heal an entire 
society and incorporate diverse rule-of-law values, such as peace and 
reconciliation, that had previously been treated as largely external to the 
transitional justice project45  
 
The restorative model that dominates this phase compromises the justice norm, as 
conceived by Sikkink, in favor of approaches that prioritize truth over criminal justice. Altering 
the metric of transitional justice’s intended outcome—effect on rule of law versus effect on 
nation-building efforts, comprising peace and reconciliation—increased the mechanisms 
available to countries in transition. Importantly, Teitel draws the distinction between the 
application of retributive justice in the first phase as intended to perform justice and justice as a 
secondary aim in the use of truth commissions primarily intended to secure peace in the second 
phase. While truth-commissions, like trials, were motivated by the goal of deterrence, it was 
similarly aspired that they would contribute to dialogue between victims and perpetrators and the 
establishment of an historical record in a nod to preservative justice. Nevertheless, by her logic, 
the limited use of criminal prosecution, in favor of alternative mechanisms, solidified an 
antagonistic relationship between the goals of justice on the one hand and peace on the other.   
The third phase is characterized as steady-state transitional justice, in which the use of 
transitional justice mechanisms are extended to situations beyond the exceptional settings of 
post-conflict environments, as well as normalized as a consequence of this very expansion and 
the conventionalization of transitional justice discourse. For Teitel, current developments in 
transitional justice are exemplified by the establishment of the International Criminal Court 
																																																								




(ICC) and the attendant return of Phase I international law as arbiter in situations of both peace 
and war. Lamenting the conflation of human rights law and the law of war, she notes the limited 
ability to critique an expanded discourse of transitional justice that cloaks itself in humanitarian 
terms in order to justify increased political discretion, politicization, irregularity in procedures, 
and unambiguous deviation from extant law in the application of justice.46  
In a critique of Teitel’s genealogical approach, Paige Arthur suggests that weaving the 
history of transitional justice requires resisting the attribution of ideas related to the field to past 
periods in which those ideas may not in fact have been held.47 Beginning the transitional justice 
narrative with a first phase following WWII obscures the profound significance of “transition” as 
recalling a specific phenomenon at the moment transitional justice is actively being conceived. 
For Arthur, the transitions from dictatorship to democracy that began in the 1980s lent 
legitimacy to certain mechanisms while limiting others given the tense environments in which 
these countries sought to balance peace and justice. In this way, compromise under exceptional 
situations is definitional to transitional justice itself. The victors’ justice enacted at Nuremberg 
was not tenable in a new environment in which stability considerations weighed heavily on 
newly established regimes. While both scholars rightly understand transitional justice as 
responsive to limiting political conditions, Arthur’s historical placement of transitional justice as 
a concept emerging under the specific conditions of transitions from dictatorship to democracy is 
a reminder of what mechanisms were meant to effect and how they are contextually bound. She 
proposes, thus, that transitional justice as originally conceived cannot be understood apart from 
its relation to democratic aims and challenges whether the legitimacy of the mechanisms that 
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came to dominate the field would maintain under transitions of a different type.48 Legitimacy, 
she reminds, restricts the imagination in transitional situations.  
In Teitel’s words, nonetheless, transitional justice became diffused throughout the world 
as “secularized religion without law.”49 And it is here at this moment of normalization and 
universalism that transitional justice must be questioned; what are the legitimate mechanisms 
available to countries in transition? The works of Teitel, Arthur, Finnemore, and Sikkink offer 
important insight and overlap, yet diverge at specific moments or are incomplete in capturing 
current international norms and dynamics that would seek to obligate the structuring of 
transitional justice policies in diverse contexts.  
Whereas Teitel identifies the Nuremberg Trials as exemplifying the heyday of criminal 
accountability50 and international legal responses to rights abuses, this moment is, for Sikkink, a 
blip in the history of the justice cascade, establishing a precedent, but otherwise moving 
undertow as the international conventions that followed WWII prioritized state responsibility 
while extending immunity to individuals.51 Interestingly, as Sikkink identifies the justice norm as 
gaining momentum in a post-Cold War world, Teitel emphasizes the supplanting of justice for 
mechanisms seeking peace. The differences are substantial when considering why such a 
misalignment occurs. While Teitel’s narrative focuses primarily on the international conditions 
driving the development of transitional justice, activism on behalf of human rights and the justice 
norm is at the center of the justice cascade and the principal force motivating Finnemore and 
Sikkink’s norm life-cycle. What Teitel identifies as moving away from legal accountability 
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through the devolution of control over transitional justice from the state to civil society, Sikkink 
recognizes as the pivotal moment for norm entrepreneurs to push forward the justice norm and 
create a critical mass of advocacy and support on behalf of the norm. While Sikkink mentions 
the concurrent rise of alternative mechanisms, such as truth-commissions, she does not, in 
contrast to Teitel, suggest that their implementation amounts to sacrificing justice in the name of 
truth for peace.  
The divergent narratives lead to a muddled concept of transitional justice and how it is to 
be understood as governing transitions today. The creation of the ICC in 1998 and the entering 
into force of the Rome Statute four years later represent for Sikkink the convergence of the 
precedent set by the Nuremberg Trials and the use of domestic and foreign trials to hold 
individuals criminally accountable for abuses.52 Equally, Teitel recognizes the ICC as 
epitomizing a third phase of transitional justice and a return to the first phase prioritization of 
international legal responses.53 Yet, the normalization of transitional justice in Teitel’s 
terminology, or the internalization of the justice norm, if using that of Finnemore and Sikkink do 
not lend themselves to a critical assessment of the contemporary balance of transitional justice 
mechanisms. Indeed, while Teitel’s genealogical approach makes mention of the application of 
transitional justice mechanisms in diverse environments, including transitions to peace, it does 
not account for how the field and the mechanisms it touts may be responsive to these new 
contexts. Likewise, Sikkink’s mention of the criticisms mounted against the court does not alter 
what seems to be the infinitely forward moving momentum of the justice cascade throughout its 
life cycle or propose how it may be understood alongside alternative mechanisms.  
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If in theory the predominance of individual criminal responsibility is accepted, its place at 
the top must be problematized by its results in practice. Apart from questioning the application of 
transitional justice in contexts outside of transitions to democracy54, Arthur challenges the 
empirics behind transitional justice claims. Recent research has responded to the empirical gap 
through quantitative and qualitative analyses of case studies that seek to elucidate the causal 
mechanisms at work in transitional justice policies and the intended outcomes pursued by the 
same.  
Prescient of the criticism facing criminal prosecution based on its results in transitional 
societies, Sikkink dedicates a chapter of The Justice Cascade to the effects of human rights 
prosecutions in Latin America and another to their global effects.55  Using data from Latin 
America, she finds no evidence to suggest that prosecutions affect democracy in either a positive 
or negative way, though she notes that the region used trials extensively and there have been few 
democratic reversals, a weak argument of correlation and not a strong indication of causation. 
Similarly she suggests it is difficult to contend that prosecutions engender greater conflict, given 
the diminishing number of sustained conflicts in the region,56 and notes the positive effects of 
prosecutions on establishing rule of law. She finds that prosecutions do have a positive effect on 
a country’s human rights record, further specifying that while countries with greater experience 
with democracy are more likely to hold trials, this experience does not account for improvements 
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in human rights. She likewise finds that countries that had both prosecutions and a truth 
commission showed greater improvement in human rights than countries with just prosecutions.  
Turning to the global effects of prosecutions, Sikkink similarly finds that they do help to 
improve human rights conditions, especially when persistent and frequent. Similar to the effects 
seen in Latin America, prosecutions along with the presence of a truth commission improves 
human rights conditions more than prosecutions alone. She finds that prosecutions in countries 
transitioning from civil war are not more prone to lead to a worsening in human rights. 
Interestingly, her data show an impact across borders, as repression decreases in a transitional 
country if four or more of its neighbors have prosecution activity even if that country does not.  
The positive effects Sikkink finds for prosecutions on improving a country’s human 
rights records are contrasted in part by the general results of Andrew G. Reiter, Leigh A. Payne, 
and Tricia D. Olsen’s study on the impact of transitional justice mechanisms in 161 countries 
from 1970-2007.57 They find that trials58 do not have a statistically significant effect on human 
rights and democracy on their own, but when trials are coupled with amnesties, or combined 
with amnesties and truth commissions, improvements can be seen in both areas. Similarly, they 
find that amnesties alone do not have a statistically significant effect and the use of truth 
commissions by themselves negatively affect human rights and democracy. Their results lead 
them to suggest an holistic approach to transitional justice, which they demonstrate does, in the 
long run, have a positive effect on democracy and human rights, through its incorporation of 
multiple mechanisms that balance accountability with forgiveness for crimes deemed less grave. 
Likewise, they signal a need to carefully parse out the characteristics of truth commissions that 
may have a positive or negative impact on human rights and democracy and suggest the 
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sequencing of mechanisms, such amnesties followed by trials, that may allow for the greater 
success of transitional justice overall.  
While the previous studies focus on the end goals of democracy, human rights, and rule 
of law, Elin Skaar addresses the glaring lack of research on the relationship between transitional 
justice mechanisms and reconciliation, the empirics of which are complicated not only by 
conceptual multiplicity, but also the limited timeframes available in which to gauge outcomes.59 
Engaging with the concept of reconciliation requires first questioning the way in which it is 
understood; according to Skaar, this can range from the political, moral, and religious and can be 
imagined as a goal, a process, or both. It can occur at the macro and micro level. Her general 
findings suggest that empirical research to date is inconclusive on the relationship between 
transitional justice mechanisms and their intended outcomes. Regarding trials, she states that 
simply not enough time has passed in most cases to make a judgment on their effects. And, 
significantly, she notes the difficulty of tracing the mechanisms by which trials might affect 
reconciliation given their primary use for different aims. As such, research tends to draw 
conclusions on the reconciliatory effects of trials as ancillary to such goals as reduced repression 
and positive effects on democracy.  
Turning to alternative mechanisms, Skaar finds equally inconclusive evidence to support 
claims of their fostering reconciliation. In looking at the evidence of amnesties’ possible 
contribution, she finds that there have been limited single case studies on their effects and that 
parsing out the effects of amnesties is complex, given the difficulty of attributing outcomes to an 
amnesty and not local processes that emerge in response to the amnesty itself and a perceived 
lack of official state response to violence.  In discussing truth commissions, she notes, similarly 
to trials, that studies do not determine reconciliation as the specific end goal, thus leaving 
																																																								




improvements (or regressions) in human rights or democracy as correlates of reconciliation and 
summarizes the contradictory findings of studies that fail to lead to a determinate answer on if 
truth commissions positively or negatively affect either. She attributes the limited empirical 
evidence to three principal factors, including a too-short timeframe in which to assess outcomes 
given their recent employment, a reliance on anecdotal evidence and moral convictions, and a 
reliance on the reception of a commission’s report as a marker of its success or failure, leaving 
such studies short-sighted and unable to capture any possible long-term dynamics of 
reconciliation.  
The results of these studies are sobering for human rights and transitional justice 
advocates that have been criticized for their faith-based, rather than fact-based, championing of 
the value of transitional justice mechanisms in societies trying to redress past injustices. While 
such empirical studies do not provide a definitive answer on what mechanisms are right or wrong 
in a given context, they do suggest the need for practitioners, advocates, and academics to more 
sincerely examine the intentions and effects of transitional justice policies. As a first step, there 
is a striking need for greater conceptual and causal clarity. As Skaar notes, 
In the transitional justice literature, concepts such as truth, justice 
and reconciliation, in addition to carrying a multiplicity of 
meaning, are often treated simultaneously as independent variables 
and dependent variables60 
 
Disentangling the concepts is a difficult, but necessary task, if policies are to be designed to 
specific ends and, likewise, if the impact of mechanisms are to be understood. Similarly, it is 
necessary to recognize that these mechanisms do not necessarily operate uniformly at the 
international, national, and local levels and their impacts must be valued in both the short and 
long terms.  
																																																								




 Calls for a comprehensive framework for understanding key conceptual relationships 
between and outcomes of transitional justice mechanisms in turn highlight the need to re-
examine the relationship between human rights and transitional justice and the demands they 
make upon countries in transition. In a criticism of contemporary human rights advocacy, César 
Rodríguez-Garavito identifies what he observes as five problems within the human rights 
movement.61 The first relates to the verticality and rigidity of both human rights discourse and 
the movement itself. The second is its tendency towards over-legalization, which he perceives as 
exclusionary in part due to the technical barriers it raises to access, utilization, and participation. 
The third criticizes the movement’s work to adopt legal frameworks as an end in and of itself and 
as such failing to register the impact for better or worse that they engender. The fourth notes the 
glaring disparity between the Global North and the Global South in terms of access to and 
decisions about funding and the disproportionate power relations that result. Lastly, he calls into 
question the failure of the movement to empirically assess the impacts of the norms that it 
promotes.  
 These criticisms are central to the need to distinguish the transitional justice field from 
human rights and assess how transitional justice can and should be responsive to such 
commentary. In her genealogy, Teitel notes that the transitional justice field incorporated the 
rhetoric of human rights in the second phase, although integrated within a restorative approach 
sensitive to the limiting political conditions of the time.62 The peace versus justice debate that 
mars the distinction between transitional justice and human rights rests upon the conceptual 
bounds of each term and their relation. Does the use of alternative mechanisms truly sacrifice 
justice in the name of peace, or is peace more intimately and integrally related to justice than an 
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inflexible human rights movement may allow? Indeed, as Arthur eloquently states in opposition 
to the just desert theory of punishment: 
It may be argued, however, that what made the field of transitional 
justice distinct from human rights was its addition of causal beliefs 
about facilitating a transition to the principled beliefs of human 
rights actors…about right and wrong. Resolving that tension by 
placing decisions about justice squarely in the sphere of 
international law might, on that definition, effectively announce 
the dissolution of transitional justice itself.63 
 
Her statement is an important reminder of the exceptional circumstances under which transitional 
justice mechanisms are put into practice. While the justice cascade has seemingly brought a tide 
of retributive justice, calculations must still be made. Even the ICC, heralded as an enforcer of 
human rights and a site of individual criminal accountability, is conscious of this particular role 
as mediator in transitional situations.  
Illustrative of this point is the Court’s activity in Colombia and the scrutiny it places upon 
the country as a signatory of the Rome Statute. Though Colombia ratified the Rome Statute in 
2002, it exempted itself from the Court’s war crimes jurisdiction until 2009. The ICC has been 
credited as heavily influencing transitional justice policy in Colombia. Indeed, the International 
Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) has noted the stated exception as driven by concern over 
its interference in future negotiations with the AUC, while likewise heralding the Court’s affect 
on public discourse that now generally accepts amnesty and pardons as incompliant with 
international law.64  For years the Prosecutor’s Office has maintained an open preliminary 
investigation into grave violations of human rights and crimes against humanity occurring after 
2002 and war crimes after 2009. In comments made regarding this investigation, James Stewart, 
the Deputy Prosecutor of the ICC, noted the Prosecutor’s interest in the case is limited to the use 
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of criminal prosecution as a tool of transitional justice. 65 The critical question relates to whether 
domestic proceedings within Colombia satisfy its international obligations, thus proscribing 
further ICC proceedings under the principal of complementarity. 
The Deputy Prosecutor makes clear the Court’s concerns regarding the possibility of 
suspended, reduced, or alternative sentences and their compliance with the law, as well as 
amnesties for crimes under the court’s jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the Prosecutor, Fatou 
Bensouda, released a statement that is cautiously optimistic of the peace process and agreements 
made to date. Significantly, she makes mention of the possibility of her using her discretion in 
not pursuing a case if it falls within the interests of justice, in consideration of victims’ interests 
and the gravity of the crime:  
Today, I have learned of the latest developments in Havana where 
the Government of Colombia and the FARC-EP have jointly taken 
a significant step towards ending the decades-long armed conflict in 
the country. Any genuine and practical initiative that achieves this 
laudable goal, while paying homage to justice as a critical pillar of 
sustainable peace, is of course welcomed by my Office. Our hope is 
that the agreement reached by the parties on the creation of a 
Special Jurisdiction for Peace in Colombia does just that. I note 
with optimism that the agreement excludes the granting of any 
amnesty for war crimes and crimes against humanity, and is 
designed, amongst others, to end impunity for the most serious 
crimes.66 
 
Her statement makes several critical points. The first recognizes the constraints of negotiating 
within a context of ongoing conflict by praising practicality in the design of initiatives. Secondly, 
she makes an explicit link between justice and peace as dependent and not antagonistic. Thirdly, 
she confirms the prioritization of international law in relation to specific crimes included in 
international conventions.  
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 Nonetheless, criticism within Colombia and in the human rights community persists. One 
of the most vocal opponents of Agreement on the Victims of the Conflict, Colombia’s Inspector 
General Alejandro Ordóñez, lamented the document as an example of grave impunity. In his 
estimation, the draft agreement fails to ensure sentences that are proportional to the crimes 
committed nor do they require jail time; as such, the concerns of the ICC may manifest in the 
moving forward of an investigation into the country’s failure to provide justice by international 
standards.67 The concerns expressed by Ordóñez have been echoed by international NGOs, such 
as Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Amnesty International (AI), which are closely monitoring 
developments in the country. In its report “Colombia: Dealing Away Justice,” Human Rights 
Watch concludes that though amnesty is off the table for crimes against humanity and serious 
war crimes, the alternative sentences fall well short of meaningful punishment that might offer 
justice to the abusers’ victims.68 HRW’s Americas Director, Jose Miguel Vivanco, expresses 
skepticism that the agreement as currently devised could ultimately pass the careful scrutiny of 
the Prosecutor. 
Returning to Rodríguez-Garavito’s criticisms of the human right’s movement, it is clear 
that a strict view of justice as retributive in transitional situations is, as Arthur warns, anathema 
to transitional justice itself. While the Prosecutor issues strong support for international law and 
standards relating to specific crimes, she, likewise, takes the perspective that transitions require 
flexibility in the face of political limitations. Approaching transitional justice in this way allows 
for the development of policies that may be more fully responsive to the complexities of 
countries in transition. Addressing the four additional criticisms, their application to transitional 
justice is equally significant. Admitting alternative mechanisms under the rubric of justice allows 
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for the incorporation of marginalized viewpoints that might otherwise be lost to hegemonic legal 
frameworks; likewise, testing the results of each mechanism supports the idea of justice as a 
concept in practice and not empty rhetoric irrelevant to reality. Noting the disparity between the 
Global North and the Global South is critical to understanding how policies may be misguided 
and is first step in recognizing that a singular concept of justice is only discursively, not legally, 
defendable. While international human rights law provides an extensive framework to protect 
victims’ rights to truth, justice, reparations, and non-repetition, the prevailing mechanism to 
ensure the satisfaction of these rights is not specified. As such, the discourse on human rights 
that purports a legal obligation of states to hold rights abusers criminally accountable through a 
strict approach to justice may inhibit rather than contribute to attaining the goal of peace. 
Retributive justice must instead be considered alongside additional transitional justice 
mechanisms and policy designed according to the empirical benefits derived from their 
implementation. While calling for a fact-based approach to transitional justice does not currently 
provide conclusive answers as to best practices, continuing to rely on faith based assumptions as 
to mechanisms’ competency in transitional settings only serves to obscure causal relationships in 
transitional justice policy.   
 This section has sought to address a number of concerns beginning with the opportunities 
for justice allowed for by both human rights and transitional justice. While the tension between 
both fields is clear, it is principally a matter of method, rather than ideals that differentiate the 
course of action that either promotes in the pursuance of justice. The historical overview of the 
development of transitional justice is meant as a guide to the development of justice as a concept 
itself, from its retributive beginnings to its expansion to incorporate restorative ideas, along with 




distributive aspects. Evaluating whether or not an agreement may lay the groundwork for a stable 
and lasting peace requires demarcating clear conceptual and causal relationships that may only 
be possible through continued and rigorous empirical research. While this section has not 
provided definitive answers on what justice is in Colombia, it should serve as a backdrop to an 
analysis of current negotiations that seek to determine the same. Through the lens of transitional 
justice, it is possible to trace Colombia’s development of policies in step with the field in order to 
assess the country’s progress towards achieving the ultimate aim of peace, as well as identify the 
critical disconnects between national initiatives and the lived realities of conflict that may inhibit 
its ultimate attainment.  
 
The Domestic Course of Action 
Though conflict has been a constant in Colombia since the mid 20th century, the state’s 
response to violence has wavered as a consequence of changing international tides, as well as 
domestic pressures and circumstances. The duration of the conflict allows the unique opportunity 
to periodize state policy in one country over the long term in order to isolate how transitional 
justice has been manipulated into a particular form at a specific moment and why such policies 
may take the shape they do. In doing so, this section will further elucidate international dynamics 
related to human rights and justice as they have played out in the Colombian context, as well as 
the limiting domestic political conditions under which transitional justice policies have been 
forged.  
Cycles 3, 4, and 5 will be focused on, though the divisions between them must be 
considered fluid, as the experience of transitional justice in one period deeply impacts the future 




in the early 1990s with smaller guerrilla groups, Cycle 4 to the demobilization of the AUC in the 
early 2000s, and Cycle 5 to the current government negotiations with the FARC. Tracing the 
development of transitional justice policy in Colombia, however, requires first problematizing 
the concept of transition—transition to what?—and how the absence or identification of a clear 
transitional moment may impact policy prescriptions in the context of ongoing conflict.  
As Teitel explains, the current and third phase of transitional justice is characterized by 
its normalization and expansion, or what she terms ‘transitional justice all the time’.69 Yet, what 
she identifies as a contemporary state of exception in the field is in essence the enduring 
challenge of transitional justice in Colombia. In each cycle in which transitional justice 
mechanisms have been enacted to address a conflict that has spanned all phases of Teitel’s 
genealogy, there has never been a clear political transition. This is particularly salient when 
considering Arthur’s contention that too often the lens of transitional justice is used to assess 
mechanisms that may not have been contemplated under the transitional justice rubric at the time 
of their enactment. This section is conscious of such a critique and confesses that while each 
cycle is analyzed for the implementation of transitional justice mechanisms as currently 
understood, they might, more precisely, have been considered within broader policies related to 
national politics, peace, and security.   
This point will later make clear the significance of Colombia’s approach to the 
termination of the conflict, its view of the conflict itself, and consequently, what could be seen as 
transitional justice delayed. Arthur eloquently approaches this issue in her analysis of the 
expansion of transitional justice to situations that include transitions to peace and the possible 
need to reconfigure both normative aims (democracy and justice) and the mechanisms that may 
be more adept at addressing the challenges facing post-conflict situations: 
																																																								




Justice claims in such contexts are much more likely to revolve 
around reintegration of ex-combatants, ethnic cleansing, war 
crimes, internal displacement, property restitution, power sharing, 
wealth-sharing, and claims for self-determination. The measures of 
prosecutions, truth-telling, reparations, and reform of an abusive 
state apparatus should not be assumed to map neatly onto these 
very different practical problems—if it all.70  
 
Indeed, all such issues enumerated above have come into play in Colombia. The challenge to the 
field of transitional justice is to adapt to such environments in a way that empirically addresses 
outcomes and adjusts recommendations accordingly, if the field is in fact translatable to such 
differently complex contexts.  
 In addition to questions concerning justice in times of transition to peace, the case of 
Colombia further complicates an assessment of transitional justice mechanisms given that no 
such transition has occurred. As such, mechanisms designed for implementation in contexts in 
which a political transition has already taken place are, instead, being initiated in a country 
seeking a prospective transition to peace in an environment of ongoing conflict. Jemima García-
Godos and Knut Andreas O. Lid specify the exceptional nature of the Colombian case and the 
particular frustrations of justice caused by the continuation of violence.71 They note that in this 
context, transitional justice policy has evolved in piece-meal fashion, contemplating various 
armed groups at distinct moments and through distinct terms, while likewise, and 
controversially, linking justice measures and victims rights with those traditionally enacted under 
the umbrella of peace and security with a focus on combatants. The complexity of the 
environments in which transitional justice mechanisms are expected to operate are of principal 
importance in turning to the three cycles contemplated in this section.  
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Cycle 3: Early Demobilization of Guerrillas in the 1990s 
 Looking at the third cycle of transitional justice beginning in the 1990s, two policies 
stand out as the principal mechanisms used by the government to address the conflict situation: 
amnesty and pardon. These mechanisms, combined with an opening of the political 
establishment, characterize this period as one not principally focused on justice, but instead, on 
achieving partial peace. Both the political and legal benefits conferred to demobilized soldiers 
through the reform of the Constitution and instituted DDR program served to make peace more 
attractive than war for a number of ex-combatants and their armed groups.  
In their work on the 1991 National Constituent Assembly to reform the Constitution 
(ANC), David Rampf and Diana Chavarro outline the exceptional state of affairs that led 
President Barco to utilize martial law to first introduce a referendum on a possible ANC.72 While 
the Barco administration’s proposed reform of the Constitution in 1989 failed in Congress, it did 
lead the M-19 to reorganize as a political party and paved the way for continued negotiations 
with multiple guerrilla groups. Political participation as an incentive to laying down arms was 
key in the early demobilization of guerrilla combatants. Indeed, through the proposal of such 
reforms, the government effectively addressed the principal concern of the ideologically 
motivated groups that took up arms to challenge the traditionally exclusive political system. 
Likewise, support for such reforms was echoed throughout various sectors within the country. 
With the growth of a broad coalition of support, President Gaviria adopted the referendum by 
presidential decree in 1990, obviating the Congressional approval that had served as an obstacle 
under President Barco.  
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With the M-19 entering the legal political process and intensifying calls from 
movements, most especially student organizations, to rewrite a Constitution seemingly incapable 
of addressing Colombia’s multi-faceted conflict, institutional reform became the leading means 
through which to achieve peace. According to Sergio Jaramillo, Yaneth Giha, and Paul Torres, 
all nine peace agreements signed between 1989 and 1994 contemplated political benefits for 
former guerrillas, including participation in the ANC, government support and guarantees for 
their legal political movements, and the appointment of two of the movements’ members to 
Congress.73 In the end, the ANC included 23 members of former guerrilla groups, or members of 
guerrilla groups in advanced stages of negotiations, including 19 from the Democratic Alliance 
of the M-19 (the political party of the former guerrilla group), 2 from EPL, 1 from PRT and 1 
from MAQL.74 The pardons and amnesties for political crimes as contemplated in Transitorial 
Article 30 of the new Constitution were intentioned to restore these guerrilla groups to legality. 
Jaramillo, Giha, and Torres characterize this period as one of forgiving and forgetting; while 
certain individuals faced criminal proceedings for non-political crimes, including kidnappings 
and homicides not related to the conflict, the legal benefits potentially applied to all demobilized 
combatants accused of crimes committed prior to the new Constitution.75  
 Transitional justice policy was thus molded to contribute to the larger project of opening 
the political system and addressing the exclusionary institutions that had for decades permitted, if 
not fueled, the ongoing conflict. Rampf and Chavarro suggest, nonetheless, that the 1991 
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Constitution has achieved only limited success in its intentions. While providing for political 
inclusivity and the use of new participatory tools (including plebiscites, referendums, recalls of 
officials, etc), elites threatened by the new system doubled down on their support of paramilitary 
groups to protect their grip on power; meanwhile, the two largest guerrilla groups, the FARC and 
the ELN, did not participate in the ANC or drafting of the new Constitution. These factors have 
greatly restricted the practice of democracy as imagined by the ANC and the new Constitution’s 
contribution to peace.76  
 In an additional criticism, Jaramillo, Giha, and Torres maintain that the measures adopted 
in the 1990s continue to represent an open wound within the country. By favoring peace over 
justice, the Colombian government largely ignored long-term commitments to rebuilding 
communities and providing adequate redress to victims. In their overview of the reparations 
program undertaken in the 1990s, Jaramillo, Giha, and Torres note the weakness of the collective 
reparations program, targeted specifically at infrastructure projects with little input from or 
involvement with the victims such projects were meant to assist. Likewise, they criticize the 
absence of an individual or administrative reparations program to provide compensation for the 
victims of the various demobilized groups. While the incorporation of former armed groups into 
the political system signified a long-overdue opening of the traditionally exclusionary system 
and the perceived dip in violence during the period 1992-199577 suggests the positive effects of 
the demobilizations, at least in the short-term, truth, justice, and reparations are, to current 
standards of transitional justice, startlingly absent or incomplete. 
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 The use of amnesties and pardons in order to ensure greater political stability while 
ignoring the needs of victims speaks volumes as to the government’s approach to the conflict at 
the time. Firstly, it recognizes the political nature of these guerrilla groups at the same time that 
the exclusion of other armed actors, including the paramilitaries and drug traffickers, are 
seemingly cast apart in a conflict of another sort. Such an approach leads to a strategy of 
eliminating one spoiler at a time in an effort to secure peace gradually. A transition and possible 
reconciliation that considered the interests of victims was not yet contemplated. Peace in 
Colombia in the 1990s was not yet subject to the terms of transitional justice. While 
constitutional reform, the granting of legal and political benefits, and the use of amnesties and 
pardons were intentioned to alleviate conflict dynamics, justice was not an identifiable cause of 
peace.  
In the years leading up to the demobilization of AUC forces, violence along with victim 
counts surged while protections for victims of the conflict remained insufficient from a human 
rights standpoint. Indeed, in her overview of laws related to victims rights and protections at the 
end of the 1990s and early 2000s, Nicole Summers highlights that while Law 387 of 1997 
declared the responsibility of the state to care for displaced persons, it did not declare the state 
responsible for establishing protective mechanisms, nor declare a principle of victims’ rights to 
be free from displacement.78 Likewise, it did not provide for reparations. As Jaramillo, Giha, and 
Torres contend, the five minimal components of a reparations program, as established by 
international law—rehabilitation, compensation, restitution, satisfaction, and guarantees of non-
repetition—were entirely absent during this period.79   
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Cycle 4: Demobilization of AUC Forces 
 As the country entered the new century bolstered by U.S. aid under Plan Colombia, the 
fight against illegal narcotics and terrorism intensified, placing the paramilitaries at the center of 
military efforts to halt the growth of illegal armed groups. Partly in response to the looming 
threat of extradition to the U.S., the AUC announced a unilateral ceasefire and began 
negotiations with the government in 2002. Unlike the earlier negotiations with guerrilla forces, 
the AUC was not conferred political status, but rather participated as an armed group at the 
margins of the law, altering from the outset the government’s approach to both combatants and 
their victims. Indeed, while former guerrilla combatants were afforded legal and political 
benefits under the DDR program of the 1990s at the same time that victims’ rights were largely 
not addressed, the cornerstone of the peace process with the AUC was the coupling of benefits 
for the demobilized with victims’ rights in a single legal instrument.80  
 That instrument, Law 975 of 2005, known as the Justice and Peace Law (JPL), was 
developed in response to criticism of a proposed alternative sentencing law from both the 
international community and domestic victims’ rights groups.81 The JPL was intended to correct 
the imbalances of previous laws by explicitly providing for the needs of both the demobilized 
and their victims. Eligibility under the terms of the JPL, which include the possibility of 
alternative sentencing, between 5 and 8 years of jail time, or conditional amnesty, or pardon, 
requires a commitment not to re-engage in illegal activities, as well as to contribute to the 
demobilization of their armed groups and provide information concerning the whereabouts of 
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disappeared persons. As Jaramillo, Giha, and Torres stress, eligibility does not, however, 
guarantee participation, as an ex-combatant must initiate the JPL proceedings against himself.   
 Law 975 created a variety of institutions with the dual objective of facilitating peace and 
the reintegration of demobilized combatants and guaranteeing victims’ rights to truth, justice, 
and reparations.82	The National Attorney General’s Unit for Justice and Peace is charged with 
conducting investigations and preparing indictments of those who wish to receive the legal 
benefits offered by JPL, as well as verifying ex-combatants’ compliance with the conditions laid 
out. The General Ombudsman for Justice and Peace is designated as guarantor of the protection 
of victims’ rights and due process for perpetrators. The National Commission on Reparation and 
Reconciliation (CNRR) was established to develop strategies for protecting victims’ rights and 
nurturing reconciliation. Acción Social (later reorganized as the Department for Social 
Prosperity) is responsible for assisting procedures related to property claims and the unlawful 
occupation or possession of assets; likewise, the organization calculates and pays the 
compensation ordered by the Justice and Peace Courts, as well as administers the Administrative 
Reparations Fund. The Fund for the Reparation of Victims, under the direction of Acción Social, 
holds the assets surrendered by the demobilized combatants, as well as resources from the 
national government and national and international donations directed toward reparations. Eight 
Justice and Peace Chambers were established within the Superior Courts of Barranquilla and 
Bogotá; judges are charged with adjudicating the restitution of assets to victims, as well as 
determining whether the requirements of JPL have been met and if a combatant is eligible for an 
alternative sentence.  
 The two legal regimes created by the JPL have important implications for the 
administration of justice in Colombia. If an ex-combatant believes he has not committed a crime, 
																																																								




or that there if no evidence to the contrary, he must provide a statement to the Prosecutor’s 
Office and is then eligible for conditional amnesty and the benefits afforded under the DDR 
program. Alternatively, if a combatant has committed a crime, he may initiate JPL proceedings 
and seek alternative sentencing. In doing so, these so-called postulados “commit to contribute to 
the clarification of the truth, refrain from illegal and criminal acts, and declare and surrender all 
economic resources and assets to sustain proper victims reparations.”83 Following the free 
account given by the postulado, the prosecutor makes formal charges and initiates proceedings. 
After concluding a sentence under regular criminal law, the judge will determine the reduction of 
the sentence, followed by a proceeding to discuss the necessary reparations to victims. 
 Yet, as Alexander Wilde notes, “As implemented by the government, the law has 
produced little justice through prosecutions and fallen short of a global truth about the 
paramilitary past or its ongoing character in the present.”84 By October 2010, there were only 
4,479 postulados out of a total of 54,297 individually and collectively demobilized ex-
combatants. Though only roughly 8% of the demobilized population has been subject to JPL 
proceedings, the state was institutionally unprepared for the extent of crimes that would be 
confessed, and thus open to prosecutorial investigation. The process has moved at a halting pace; 
the first sentence was handed down in 2010 and by 2012 only 14 sentences had been reached.85 
While the JPL has led to the registration of more than 400,000 victims through ex-combatants’ 
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free accounts, Jaramillo, Giha, and Torres question whether the process has sufficiently served 
victims’ interests or the establishment of the truth of paramilitary crimes.86  
In a criticism of reparations under the JPL, García-Godos and O. Lid note a number of 
concerns. In order to receive reparations directly from a perpetrator through judicial proceedings, 
the law places a significant burden upon the victim in being able to individually identify the 
perpetrator and requiring their presence in court in order to make and substantiate their claims 
through either witnesses or written records. Likewise, a claim cannot be processed until a judicial 
proceeding has been completed, if at all, given that the scheme requires a perpetrator have the 
funds required for reparations.87 While the Administrative Reparations Fund, established in 
2008, allows for individuals to seek reparations from the state with a lower evidentiary threshold, 
it does not allow for claims to be made by victims of state agents. These limitations have been 
only partially addressed in the passing of the 2011 Victims’ Law.  
The Victims’ Law was enacted following intense criticism from both domestic and 
international human rights groups, as well as rulings from Colombia’s Constitutional Court 
requiring the government to adopt sweeping changes to its policies concerning internally 
displaced persons and land restitution. In her detailing of the law, Summers highlights the aims 
of the statute to comprehensively address the needs of victims through explicit transitional 
justice legislation designed to advance the goals of truth, justice, reparations, while likewise 
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ensuring non-repetition of crimes and victimization.88 She notes the achievement of the law in 
decoupling the acquiring of victim status from the judicial process of the accused victimizer, 
while simultaneously shifting the burden of proof from the victim in cases of land restitution to 
the accused usurper or current occupier. The Law also considers the role of private business in 
fueling the dispossession of land and allows for rulings against corporations that require their 
paying into the Victims’ Reparations Fund if found guilty. Significantly, the law also recognizes 
the need to compensate victims of state agents. Nonetheless, as Summers highlights, providing 
the security needed to make coming forward as a victim and claiming one’s rights a safe 
endeavor remain elusive in the presence of a weak or absent state. Likewise, the decentralization 
of the process, conceding judgment in cases to local jurisdictions, has allowed for continued 
elitism favoring businesses and rampant corruption.  
In a final criticism of the law, Summers recognizes the failure to incorporate substantial 
truth-seeking mechanisms as part of the reparation process as ultimately defeating any attempt at 
adequate material or symbolic reparations.  The Victims Law succeeded in ushering in a new era 
in truth-seeking through its absorption of the functions of the CNRR and the Historical Memory 
Group it created, along with the establishment of the Center for Historical Memory, which 
publishes frequent reports and makes claim to various strategic objectives, including the 
fostering of societal understanding of the armed conflict, public memory, conditions for creating 
peace, and testimonial and documented legacy of the conflict.89  Nonetheless, a comprehensive 
accounting of the conflict and its victims through the institution of a truth-commission has yet to 
be implemented. As García-Godos and O.Lid aptly remind, while the Justice and Peace process 
																																																								
88 Ibid.  




and the reforms initiated by the Victims Law represent significant advancements in terms of 
transitional justice in Colombia,  
This opportunity must not blind us, however, to the need to address 
what Law 975 aims for—namely peace. As victim and victimizer 
are two sides of the same coin, without the effective 
demobilization and reintegration of illegal armed actors, the goals 
of justice and reparation for the victims of Colombian armed 
conflict are unlikely to be achieved.90  
 
While the JPL, along with the Victims Law, represent a watershed moment in Colombia 
in terms of its approach to transitional justice, the goal of peace has remained the priority in a 
pre-transitional environment in which violence and armed actors remain a constant.  Transitional 
justice in this context is meant as an instrument of peace building and uniquely interwoven with 
DDR programs and an equal commitment to former combatants. Yet, taking stock of the process 
to date provides an underwhelming picture of success. Truth, as provided by the free accounts, 
has helped in concrete ways to unearth details on specific crimes, yet this judicial accounting is 
limited in both an historical and reparatory sense. Likewise, though the expansion of resources to 
assist in material reparations via alternative routes has eased the process for numerous victims 
seeking assistance, actual payouts have been both limited in number and quantity. Actual 
prosecutions have similarly suffered from a lack of expediency and breadth, while the 
reintegration of former AUC members must be cast in light of the tumultuous rise of alternative 
armed groups. These limitations on truth, justice, and reparations, along with reintegration, 
which are at the core of Colombia’s approach to transitional justice, impart crucial lessons as to 
the institutional capacity for transitional justice within the country. These ideals and the reality of 
their efficacy in practice should inform analysis of the current government negotiations with the 
FARC. 
																																																								




Cycle 5: Current Government Negotiations with the FARC 
 
Ongoing negotiations revolving around the 6-point agenda have been the source of 
serious contention both within the country and internationally, as debates have centered on what 
justice and peace can mean in Colombia. The “Agreement on the Victims of the Conflict: 
‘Comprehensive System for Truth, Justice, Reparation and Non-Repetition’, including the 
Special Jurisdiction for Peace and Commitment on Human Rights” focuses on ten principles: 
recognition of victims, recognition of responsibility, satisfaction of victims’ rights, victims’ 
participation, uncovering the truth, reparations, guarantees of protection and security, principles 
of reconciliation, and a focus on rights. It proposes the creation of a commission dedicated to 
uncovering the truth, which builds upon an earlier agreement between the FARC and the 
government that established the Historical Commission of the Conflict and its Victims (CHCV), 
a group of experts mandated with establishing an historical record of the conflict.91 The new 
truth commission will work to promote peaceful coexistence and non-repetition in tandem with a 
separate unit dedicated to the search for the disappeared. The Agreement likewise addresses the 
establishment of a Special Jurisdiction for Peace, the judicial chambers which will hear the legal 
proceedings against demobilized combatants.  
The September 23rd joint communiqué on transitional justice details the two procedures 
contemplated by the Special Jurisdiction for Peace, one for those who aid in establishing the 
truth and recognize their responsibility and another for those who do not or do so with delay. 
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Those who do contribute to the truth and admit their responsibility will not face prison time, but 
will instead face restrictions on their liberty for five to 8 years and will be required to participate 
in acts of reparation and reconciliation. Those who delay in admitting their responsibility and 
contributing to the truth will face 5 to 8 years of jail time. Those who do not recognize their 
responsibility are subject to between 15 and 20 years of jail time. Political and related crimes 
will be covered by pardons and amnesties in a future law to be specified.  
While the agreements to date have developed a broad framework for transitional justice, 
seemingly incorporating truth, justice, and reparations, alongside reintegration, skepticism 
prevails. Cognizant of the criticism, President Santos has maintained that the agreement, while 
not perfect, does require justice, but justice as qualified by the restraints of peace.92 Critics 
contend that such concessions leave not only the state open to international litigation, but also the 
victims exposed to continued violations of their rights. Human Rights Watch has been most 
vocal in drawing attention to the disproportionality of an alternative sentence for gross violations 
of human rights that provides for no jail time.93  Likewise, supporters of the agreements point out 
that much remains to be specified, including how judges, along with the cases they will 
adjudicate, will be chosen.  
 The current polemic regarding Colombia’s transitional justice policy revolves around two 
specific tensions. The first responds to the debate between the relationship between peace and 
justice and the prioritization of one over the other. This tension corresponds with the equally 
contested relationship between human rights and transitional justice itself. Through its national 
policy, the Colombian government has seemingly given its answer. The exceptional 
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circumstances have led to policies prioritizing both peace and victims, while asserting that justice 
is not solely the domain of legal accountability. If justice is conceived in such a way, the second 
tension corresponds to the ability to implement related policies. Colombia’s prior experiences 
with transitional justice should be instructive in this respect.  
From earlier analysis of the JPL, criticisms revolving around issues of institutional 
incapacity and unpreparedness, which led to a process that adapted as it went along, should 
inform the current design of institutional framework. While victims may have benefitted through 
the expansion of their rights, the lack of their incorporation from the start, along with the lack of 
specificity related to case selection and eligibility of former combatants, led to volatility in 
public perception of the process and in participants’ success in the programs. Likewise, an 
obvious, though important point remains to highlighted: despite the enactment of various 
transitional justice mechanisms, Colombia remains at war. If peace has always been the metric 
for these mechanisms’ success, it is reasonable to question whether they are apt to deal pre-
emptively with transitions to peace, or how they might be more effectively designed.  
Addressing the challenges of transitional justice to achieve its aims and the persistence of 
conflict in Colombia re-focuses the discussion towards what has been identified as the most 
promising route of research, local justice, and its ability to bridge the gap between mechanisms 
and outcomes. Putting justice into practice inherently requires imagining justice at the local 
level. Whether the debates between national and international standards of justice or human 
rights and transitional justice are resolved, the laboratory for the pursuance of peace is at the 
grassroots. Any form of justice that intends to build peace in Colombia must be cognizant of 
context; justice on the ground is not just a concept, it will in practice seek to ameliorate abuses in 




justice measures satisfy victims’ rights may depend on local dynamics and the varied 
experiences of the conflict. Similarly, local experiences of war should impact the understandings 
of the realities of instituting justice and peace in areas deeply affected by violence. While this 
section has sought to trace the development of transitional justice policy in Colombia and the 
way in which justice has been conceived at the national level, the following section intends to 
deconstruct the possibilities of justice and peace at the “community” level. It will contend that 
the lived realities of the conflict require a transitional justice policy attuned to local experiences 
in a country disparately impacted by the conflict and the armed actors that have sought territorial 
control.  
 
Taking the Grassroots’ Pulse 
Increasingly, the standardized ‘tool-kit’ of transitional justice—the mechanisms that have 
come to be supported and exported by those in field—has been challenged by a re-focusing of 
policy outcomes on the people and communities they are meant to serve. ‘Local’ transitional 
justice contrasts the requirements of international norms with the desires and needs of victims on 
the ground, thus problematizing the disjunction between a burgeoning field and the subjects on 
which it stakes it claims. The critical questions that emerge in this instance are for whom is 
transitional justice speaking, and are victims’ voices being heard? Likewise, a turn to the local in 
transitional justice policy requires shifting the unit of analysis from the national to the 
community, humbling policies that suggest cohesion in a nation state in which alternative 
institutions and disparate conflict realities have come to structure demonstrations of violence and 




abstracts as resolution at the local level, contemplating the micro-dynamics of conflict and the 
victims it has registered, moves to the forefront of policy concern.  
In their introduction to a comprehensive volume on local transitional justice, Rosalind 
Shaw and Lars Waldorf suggest that listening to the voices of victims and ‘localizing’ 
transitional justice leads to a destabilization of the field itself.94 The intellectual and normative 
frames of transitional justice, they argue, are un-grounded in the realities of conflict situations, 
requiring not only the enumerating of lessons learned and best practices in a given environment, 
but a fundamental questioning of the transcendence of these frames as a whole. They raise the 
need for transitional justice to engage with affected persons in order to assess how mechanisms 
both address their needs and respond to their priorities in post-conflict settings. In their 
conceptualization, localized transitional justice is a place-based approach that makes the essential 
recognition that victims’ voices must not be subsumed by international standards or elite 
priorities. Likewise, they argue, customary law, which may govern in a particular locality, must 
not be conflated with the primitive, nor instituted as a nod to the traditional with a similar 
disregard for outcomes.  
Their work highlights a number of significant points. First, while transitional justice may 
have made an of-recent turn towards the local, the case-by-case basis of this re-focusing has not 
yet significantly altered the field itself, leaving intact the frames that misguide the 
standardization of policy prescriptions. This issue is not only part and parcel of debates 
concerning the tensions between human rights and transitional justice and international standards 
and national policies, but likewise obstructs a self-conscious re-thinking of the field as a whole. 
Is transitional justice entering a new phase? Is it even the right field to address these post-conflict 
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concerns? Second, localizing transitional justice requires restructuring the priorities and practice 
of these mechanisms in order to ensure their responsiveness to the needs and desires of victims 
and local communities and their engagement with the same. Third, their place-based approach 
draws attention to the need to recognize conflict as heterogeneous, not only across, but within 
national borders. By approaching the use of customary law, they draw attention to the emergence 
of un-official channels that govern both conflict and its resolution. A place-based approach is 
sensitive to the realities of conflict and the forces that may drive those living within them. 
Addressing the work of Sverker Finnström, in the same volume, they summarize: 
Finnström describes what we might term a pragmatic pluralism in 
which people select, in different contexts and different historical 
moments, which of several strategies will best allow them to 
survive and to reconstruct their lives. ‘The much-debated issue 
about the restorative and retributive dimensions of justice,’ he 
argues, ‘is not really about any final either-or. Rather, in the 
moments of everyday life, it is a kind of acceptance of the 
complexities of the situation so that life can go on’95 
 
In Colombia, the first of these issues has played out in the previously discussed tensions 
between the two camps designated as either “friends” or “enemies” of peace. While the national 
government has chosen a path that aligns itself with international standards of transitional justice, 
eschewing the strict demands for prosecutions made by the international human rights movement 
in favor of policies that compromise on retributive justice in order to attain peace, these policies 
leave much to be desired in terms of their engagement with victims and local communities. 
Likewise, disaggregating the conflict in Colombia following a place-based approach brings to 
the surface the multiple realities of violence lived throughout the vast and unevenly affected 
territory.  
																																																								




In their detailing of state institutions at the local level and their effect on victimization 
and justice in the conflict, Mauricio García-Villegas and Jose Rafael Espinosa suggest that what 
they term ‘institutional apartheid’—the privileging of one region over another—has led to the 
extreme vulnerability of the rights of Colombians in the peripherals of the country and their 
increased victimization compared to more favored areas.96 Their measure of the efficacy of local 
official channels of justice, calculated as the relationship between the presence of career track 
judges and the successful prosecution of homicides in the area, reveal striking results. They find 
that municipalities with ‘low’ and ‘very low’ efficacy ratings generally correlate to areas in 
which there is a prevalence of coca crops, high levels of forced displacement, the presence of 
illegal armed groups, and higher percentages of Afro-Colombians and indigenous populations. 
The findings represent a vicious cycle in the conflict: state absence in traditionally Afro-
Colombian and indigenous areas leads to the proliferation of armed groups and illegal economies 
that intensify the victimization of these vulnerable populations and lead to further state 
abandonment as armed groups increase their territorial control.  
García-Villegas and Espinosa’s conclusion that transitional justice must consequentially 
incorporate a regional focus responds to a need to address institutional capacity in any policy that 
intends to mitigate conflict and begin to establish or restore state presence as a foundation for 
achieving peace. Nevertheless, their work remains cognizant of the parallel systems of justice 
and institutions that have developed concurrently in areas where the state has been absent. 
Recognizing the presence of both official and unofficial institutions within the country highlights 
the significance of what has been theorized as ‘wartime political orders’.97 In his development of 
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the concept, Paul Staniland suggests that a typology of such orders—who rules and how—is 
necessary in order to move beyond the description of conflict areas as violent and identify how 
power is both mediated and negotiated between contending actors in a particular conflict zone. 
The arrangements, he continues, have various implications on patterns of violence against 
civilians, governance, economics, and post-war politics.98 Applied to Colombia, his typology 
contends that the distribution of territorial control of armed actors, along with the level of their 
cooperation, significantly shape conflict dynamics and necessarily influence post-conflict 
policies that must address these complex and multiple realities.  
That order exists within conflict and that who is in control matters should be further 
elaborated for its significance in transitional settings. Accounting for regional variation in 
transitional justice policy must consider which armed group established order in a given area and 
how. Evidence from Colombia suggests that not only were paramilitaries more indiscriminate in 
their killing of civilians, they also enjoyed greater levels of collaboration with official state 
institutions.99 Guerrillas, on the other hand, were more selective in their killing of civilians and 
worked against the state, creating new institutions, rather than capturing those already in 
existence. Research in this direction raises a number of issues for justice in Colombia.  
First, the collusion between the state and paramilitaries demands greater investigation as 
the failure of the JPL process to fully dismantle the structure of the AUC left intact the corrupt 
and violent structures both official and unofficial that allowed for continued abuses. The 
consequences of this failure can be seen in the continued presence of paramilitaries and 
BACRIM throughout the country. Likewise, the FARC’s establishing of order through unofficial 
institutions that carried out the functions of the state (such as an alternate justice system) must be 
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considered in a post-conflict setting. How is the state to react to these institutions into which 
populations in FARC-controlled areas have long been socialized?100 
Apart from consideration of these orders and institutions as they interact with the state is 
the second concern regarding their interaction with the populations within the areas under their 
territorial control. These areas are distinguished by varying levels and types of violence to which 
populations have been subject, along with the reactions to everyday life in these wartime 
political orders. In her study of the orders that emerge within internal conflict, Ana Arjona 
argues that re-focusing the unit of analysis to local communities will not only reveal the 
multiplicity of conflicts within one war, but will, likewise, help determine the success of 
interventions that seek to address the same. In her study of what she terms “wartime 
institutions”, Arjona contends localities must be the focal point of such research because of the 
ways in which war segments territory. She proposes a wartime social order typology that seeks a 
way to “conceptualize the emergence (and breakdown) of order as well as of the set of rules and 
arrangements that structure political, economic, and social interactions in war zones.”101 Her data 
on Colombia reveal the significance of wartime institutions in mediating issues related to public 
order and interpersonal conflicts and evidence the infrequency with which the courts were used. 
As Arjona’s work suggests, localities in conflict zones are socialized to solve problems through 
unofficial channels; where the state is absent, alternative institutions emerge. The reality of 
Colombia’s decentralization and the uneven experience of war over time and space have serious 
implications for post-conflict possibilities. She suggests:  
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The presence of armed groups brings about profound changes to 
local communities, shaping not only how war affects them (as 
victims) but also how they react to it (as agents). Variation in 
wartime social order, is therefore, likely to transcend the war, 
creating challenges and opportunities for reconciliation, 
reconstruction, and development.102 
 
Her research contends that local inhabitants have three options available to them in the presence 
of armed actors, either fleeing, resisting, or collaborating.103 Their responses are the result of 
surviving in environments in which armed groups may establish their rule in ways that range 
from coercion and a strict reliance on violence to comprehensive rule in which the armed group 
becomes the de facto conciliator in a range of civilian affairs.  
 Civilian responses to the presence of armed actors and the wartime orders and institutions 
that develop and newly structure their lives have significant implications for future prospects of 
peace, justice, and reconciliation. One such challenge to the defining of justice in a context of 
war stems from the phenomenon of “vertical victimization” in which war incentivizes affected 
communities to privatize the use of violence through the politicization of private life. Vertical 
victimization challenges the simple victim-perpetrator dichotomy, muddying the practice of 
justice in environments in which the line between either has been blurred in a context of war.  
In her study of the limits of transitional justice in these instances, Keren Marín González 
documents events in a small Colombian community in which rumors contribute to the murder of 
neighbors, denunciations of local enemies as guerillas leads to their incarceration, and attempts 
to take advantage of demobilization benefits lead to false information that shuts down a school 
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for being labeled a site of guerilla activity.104 The solution Marín suggests in such cases is legal 
pluralism, the strategy likewise promoted by García-Villegas and Espinosa, in which official 
legal measures and alternatives, such as the community board, work in tandem to facilitate 
reconciliation and the mending of community ties. Marín states,  
…this type of justice is above all else constructive; instead of 
working through penal channels that establish charges of 
innocence or guilt, it seeks a mechanism that allow the conflict to 
be negotiated and to simultaneously promote better living 
conditions105  
 
While the specific mechanisms that these boards use to achieve justice are not well enough 
enumerated, it should be of significance for the state to contemplate practices of justice that have 
emerged in communities that have for decades remained outside of official reach.    
 Further destabilizing the perpetrator-victim dichotomy, Shaw and Waldorf highlight the 
moral gray zones that often characterize intrastate conflicts, especially in instances of structural 
violence.106 The consequences of being labeled as either may result in a person’s 
depoliticization, obfuscating rather than contributing to an understanding of a conflict into which 
one may have been drawn due to political and structural reasons. In Colombia, the peace 
processes in the 1990s and the demobilization of the AUC forces in the early 2000s only partially 
addressed the structural conditions that have allowed for violence to continue for more than five 
decades. While the current process approaches the FARC as political opponents of the state, 
local communities under their control continue to face the stigma of being labeled as 
collaborators, terrorists, and equally, as innocent victims whose relationship with guerrilla forces 
is, in certain cases, stripped of its political underpinnings. Similarly, as Rosalind Shaw reminds, 
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the victim-perpetrator dichotomy, in its failure to address pre-conflict injustices, complicates the 
linking of DDR with transitional justice where rights to benefits may be contested, thus 
encouraging resentment rather than reconciliation in fragile conflict and post-conflict 
environments.107   
Turning to the alternative response of resistance, Esperanza Hernández Delgado 
addresses the role of indigenous, black, and peasant communities in their own peace-building 
efforts, establishing the agency of those most directly affected by the war as independent from 
the both the state, armed actors, and international influence. She states: 
These communities did not know the pacifist doctrine of Ghandi, 
Martin Luther King, or Mandela and yet from their needs and own 
processes they have created, adapted, and marked out grassroots 
peace initiatives, open to further improvement, in which peace has 
been conceived of as a defense of life, civil resistance to armed 
conflict, protections of the autonomy and self-determination of 
communities facing armed actors, political participation, grassroots 
development, a deepening of democracy, and a defense of culture, 
among other things.108  
 
Their acts of resistance and the forces against which these communities have resisted 
should be carefully considered in any discussion of justice and peace in Colombia. In her study 
of four such communities, Gretchen Alther highlights the role of these self-declared “peace 
communities” in providing an alternative path to building peace at the grassroots.109 These most 
marginalized and victimized communities refuse to take up arms or collaborate in any way with 
any armed actor, be it the paramilitary, guerrillas, or the state; in turn, such defiance has turned 
them into targets of these same forces. Drawing on the work of John Paul Lederach, Alther 
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proposes such communities as a necessary layer in an effort to achieve peace through 
reconciliation. Likewise, she acknowledges peace communities as the natural site for the 
resolution of the conflicts that they face, “Building peace from the grassroots rests on the idea 
that those who suffer most are those who best understand how to resist—and what resistance 
means.”110 Her work helps to re-orient post-conflict strategies towards support for communities 
as protagonists in the building of peace and safe spaces for life to go on.  
If these sites of resistance are seen as a model for grassroots peace-building efforts, their 
methods, such as declared neutrality and a focus on participatory democracy, community 
organizing, and self-protection, should inform justice policies that seek to remediate the causes 
and consequences of conflict. Focusing on the community level brings to forefront the need to 
expand transitional justice policy to incorporate historical and distributive justice aspects that 
respond to the structural violences of the ongoing conflict.  As Alther argues, support for peace 
communities may represent a strong bulwark against future violence, fostering the goal of non-
repetition at the base of transitional justice methods. Justice and peace must thus respond to the 
multiple challenges facing these communities and the non-violent alternatives that they propose. 
Consequently, security, economic opportunity, and political rights enter into the matrix of what 
justice may come to mean in Colombia.  
This section has sought to draw attention to recent literature arguing in favor of localizing 
transitional justice as a means of attuning policies to lived realities on the ground in order to 
improve the success of mechanisms employed by the field. The conflict in Colombia is fruitful 
evidence of the way in which such a re-orientation may come to destabilize the field itself, 
requiring the adaptation of its intellectual and normative frames. The idea of multiple conflicts 
within one conflict breaks down any national narrative and disallows for one-size fits all models 
																																																								




across countries, let alone across a singular country. Re-thinking transitional justice from this 
perspective opens the door to conflict actors, restoring agency to those assigned within the 
common tropes of victims, perpetrators, innocent bystanders, etc. In this way, the effects of 
localizing transitional justice should be most felt by those for whom mechanisms are intended to 
aid. While the evidence of wartime orders and institutions and their effects is ample, accounting 
for them within transitional justice policy must be similarly scrutinized through empirical 
research.  
In her summary of research to date, Skaar suggests that micro-level studies of justice at 
the local level—assessing how transitional justice mechanisms perform empirically—have 
offered the most valuable insights into achieving reconciliation in post-conflict societies. Yet, 
expanding upon Skaar’s understanding of local justice, limited to the processes originating 
within civil society that aim at restorative justice, may be the most significant challenge in 
localizing the field as whole. Specifically, it is key to draw a distinction between the concepts of 
local justice and localizing justice, as they entail unique, though related, challenges in both the 
design and testing of transitional justice policy.111 Local justice can be understood as the 
practices that emerge within a locality, such as the use of community action boards in the case of 
Colombia, as alternatives to official processes where these are either absent or insufficient. 
Localizing transitional justice requires consideration of these local justice mechanisms, along 
with additional factors, such as the effects of wartime orders and institutions on victimization 
and participation in conflict, in order to re-orient policies towards a place-based approach. 
Indeed, while localizing transitional justice would, as García-Villegas and Espinosa recommend, 
oblige the Colombian government to assess a possible incorporation of community board action 
into future policy, it would likewise caution that local justice must be evaluated to ensure it 
																																																								




complies with demands for respect for human rights, especially in the case of women and 
children, and is not enacted in a fetishism of the traditional.  
In Skaar’s determination, measuring the impact of local justice thus contends with the 
following challenge:  
Unlike formal transitional justice mechanism, which have become 
an export ‘industry’ where international funding and international 
expertise has ‘transported’ various transitional justice mechanisms 
to virtually all corners of the world, local justice practices are 
rooted in local experiences and are therefore not immediately 
comparable112 
 
The development of localized transitional justice policy is similarly strained by issues of 
comparability, compounded by the demands of a field that relies heavily on donor funding and 
expertise from international sources. In their study of the impact of truth commissions from the 
local perspective, Michal Ben-Josef Hirsch, Megan MacKenzie, and Mohamed Sesay identify 
three principal obstacles in bridging the international transitional justice paradigm with local 
perceptions of the mechanism in order to accurately account for their success from the 
community stakeholders’ point of view.113 The first concerns the overlap between advocacy, 
scholarship, and practice, resulting in a severe professional and sociological bias that privileges 
certain international organizations over local partners, converting transitional justice into an elite 
effort that assumes a mechanism’s benefit without the advantage of peer review or community 
input. The second calls into question the methodological bias towards surveys, focus groups, and 
quantitative data analysis that may further marginalize such groups as women and children. The 
third contemplates the epistemological challenge of arriving at shared understandings of such 
concepts as ‘justice’ and ‘peace’, suggesting that not only the methods of transitional justice, but 
also its language may not be translatable in varying contexts. Their work suggests there is a long 
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road ahead for the localizing of transitional justice, yet, the optimism surrounding micro-level 
studies and their possible contribution to improving the success of transitional justice 
mechanisms should encourage continued research.    
 Localizing transitional justice in Colombia is an enormous undertaking that must be 
conscious of the multiple conflicts that have emerged within a war that has enveloped the 
country for decades. While this section has focused on the need for transitional justice policy to 
respond to local dynamics, including local justice practices and the effects of wartime orders and 
institutions as a starting point, aligning mechanisms with local realities in order to ensure their 
success must likewise contend with issues of gender, geography, age, ethnicity, etc. While 
wartime orders and institutions have a significant impact on such demographic considerations, 
transitional justice policy, from its design to its implementation, must be cognizant of such 
micro-data in order to design interventions that correspond to local needs rather than a 
normatively biased framework for justice. Re-orienting transitional justice policy towards the 
local recognizes the community as the starting point for reconciliation. In this way, justice in 
Colombia is invariably layered, contested, and a process that requires a fundamental re-thinking 




A principal argument of this thesis is that without justice and reconciliation at the local level, 
peace in Colombia will remain elusive. Similarly, the achievement of these aims will require 
localizing transitional justice in such a way that reconciles international standards and domestic 
practice through the contextualization of justice in the communities that will ensure its success. 




and of the need to open safe spaces for marginalized voices in the design and implementation of 
transitional justice policy, this is not to say that local forms of justice should trump national and 
international practices. Indeed, local practices must too be analyzed for their legitimacy and 
respect of human rights, especially those of women and children. Instead, it suggests that in order 
for justice to serve the purpose of building peace, it must begin at the community level, with an 
understanding of the ways in which conflict has been experienced, lived, and resisted, as well as 
the socializing effects it has had on understandings of justice and daily practices in affected 
communities. Coming to terms with justice as a singular concept may be a fruitless task; it is not 
panacea. Instead, its contributions to peace must be viewed in tandem with efforts to ensure an 
end to the recourse to violence. It is a piece of the puzzle in the rebuilding of state and society 
relations and the structural conditions that have permitted conflict to define Colombian history 
for more than a half century.  
 Returning to the question of what justice is in Colombia acquires greater complexity 
when approached from a perspective that considers the various layers and voices that stake equal 
claim to determining an answer. A first step requires resolving tensions between standards as 
expressed by the international human rights movement and the transitional justice field. This 
thesis argues that the Colombian government has made its determination, favoring an approach 
to transitional justice that understands such interventions as inherently flexible to compromise 
under exceptional circumstances.  National policy has eschewed a strict human rights 
understanding of justice as principally retributive in nature, instead focusing policies towards 
restorative measures and alternative punishments aimed at reconciliation and achieving peace in 




 Nevertheless the course of transitional justice in the country must be empirically 
assessed, as recent research argues, based on the empirical results of a mechanism’s outcome in 
practice. While a call for a more fact-based driven field of transitional justice proposes 
methodological challenges, early studies suggest a prioritization of the community as the unit of 
analysis may significantly challenge the pre-conceived benefits of specific mechanisms. 
Continued research may help to illuminate the tangled relationships between such concepts as 
truth, justice, peace, and reconciliation in order to more aptly design policy to follow elucidated 
causal pathways.  
 Following the course of research laid out by such scholars as Shaw and Waldorf and 
Hirsch, MacKenzie, and Sesay, along with others focused on micro-level studies as the key to 
encouraging a re-thinking of transitional justice policy, will require academics, advocates, and 
practitioners to fundamentally re-asses the field. Evidence from Colombia suggests multiple 
avenues for continued research. How can transitional justice effectively operate within a context 
of continued violence and what additional peace-building policies should it be considered 
alongside? How can it operate to more effectively to contend with structural violences that belie 
calls for non-repetition and peace conceived of more broadly than as an absence of physical 
aggressions? Such questions are essential to ensuring interventions aimed at justice and peace 
remain aware of the environments in which they operate. Likewise, they underscore the need for 
efficacy in the design and implementation of transitional justice policy in the practical sense of 
prescribing mechanisms that will not only be successful, but in a realistic sense, financially 




The importance of funding in conflict and post-conflict societies cannot be overstated. In 
Colombia, estimates suggest post-conflict policies will require more than 30 million USD.114 
Directing funds towards mechanisms that will achieve their intended aims is a critical 
consideration. Concern for the verticality of the human rights movement and the elitism that 
pervades the transitional justice field must be addressed if more localized policies are to be 
developed. The marginalization of local voices that results from a hierarchy which places 
communities as the receivers of global knowledge without their participation in the design of 
policy only serves to further alienate transitional justice from the same, highlighting a critical 
disconnect between the multiple layers of justice in transitional settings. In Colombia, this 
disconnect became glaringly clear as both the demobilization of guerrillas in the 1990s, as well 
as the JPL processes unfolded. The failure of the collective reparations program in 1990s, as 
noted by Jaramillo, Giha, and Torres, stemmed in large part from insufficient consulting with the 
communities which were to receive the supposed benefits of infrastructure projects, a problem 
that has persisted under the JPL, which has been plagued by limited funds, along with 
incompatibilities between ex-combatants’ skills and community needs.115 Likewise, fear and 
resentment have resounded in communities that have received demobilized paramilitaries 
without prior knowledge or preparation.  
Bridging the gap between these layers draws attention to the critical role of local and 
international advocates and activists in making known the priorities and needs of communities, 
as well as the organizing capability of such communities themselves.116 In their study of 
obstacles impeding the success of reparations programs, RS Ratner, Andrew Woolford, and 
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Andrew C. Patterson, identify 23 steps to the claims process, from the identification of an 
actionable claim to judging that claim a success. In Colombia, while they note resistance from 
perpetrators and third parties, it is societal conditions that forestall the success of claims for 
reparations. This category is defined by continuing conflict, legal barriers, primacy of the claim 
compared to opposing interests, and an institutional unwillingness to move forward out of 
protective self-interest. They summarize, “despite middling success up to that point…various 
mobilization challenges existed in the form of deep societal divisions and imbalances of power, 
preventing the group from drawing upon its resources to surmount these obstacles.”117 It is 
precisely in the face of such challenges that Rodríguez-Garavito’s argument in favor of a human 
rights eco-system gains significant traction. He contends that a decentralization of the human 
rights movement to encourage greater collaboration and complementarity between international, 
national, regional, and local organizations will enable new leverage points to counterbalance 
continuing rights abuses. Symbiosis may be the key to enlivening what has been termed 
Colombia’s ‘immobile present’.118 
 The anecdotal ‘vaccines against violence’ that opened this thesis were intended to treat 
the causes and symptoms of conflict in mid 1990s Bogotá and formed part of a larger campaign 
to build a “culture of citizens”. This concept embraced actions aimed at constructing a peaceful 
co-existence, feelings of belonging, respect for a shared heritage, and the recognition of the 
rights and obligations of being a citizen. Intended to in part reduce levels of violence, Stacey L. 
Hunt in her study of the campaign, questions its success in achieving this explicit goal. What it 
did do, however, was fundamentally alter the way in which the state and its citizens conceived of 
themselves and of each other, legitimizing the state despite continued violence and educating 
																																																								
117 Supra n 2 at 253.  




citizens to actively assume functions, such as security and justice, traditionally provided by the 
state.119 Conflict has long been the principal architect of state and society relations in Colombia; 
the challenge for transitional justice policy will be to respond to the resultant institutions and 
structural conditions. Justice and peace may be pre-conditioned by the recognition that neither is 
synonymous with an absence of violence. Defining either must, instead, begin with knowing the 
conditions they are meant to treat in the communities that have too long suffered chronic 
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